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San Giorgio Group Case Study Overview 
This paper is one of a series – prepared by Climate Policy Initiative 
for the San Giorgio Group – examining the use of public money 
to catalyze and incentivize private investment into low carbon 
technologies and drawing lessons for scaling up green, low-
emissions funding. The San Giorgio Group case studies seek to 
provide real-world examples of what works and what does not 
in using public money to spur low-carbon growth. Through these 
case studies CPI describes and analyzes the types of mechanisms 
employed by the public sector to deal with the risks and barriers that 
impede investment, establish supporting policy and institutional 
development, and address capacity constraints.  
Disclaimer
This report is based on publicly available information and interviews 
with selected key stakeholders. Detailed information on the financing 
and contracting of the project was not available at the time of writing 
due to the ongoing bidding procedure.
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Executive summary
Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) technology has 
enormous unexploited potential1 as a reliable source of 
renewable energy. This is especially true in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, which has abun-
dant solar resources and good proximity to EU energy 
demand.
However, despite its long history of projects and trials, 
CSP remains in its early stages of development and is 
still not commercially viable. The resulting competi-
tiveness gap between CSP and less expensive carbon-
intensive energy alternatives is particularly evident 
in markets - such as those in MENA - where heavy 
fossil-fuel subsidies distort energy prices. At the same 
time, policies that would incentivize renewable energy 
sources are not in place. 
This case study analyzes how the Government of 
Morocco, a group of development banks, and private-
sector developers came together to develop the first 
phase of a 500 MW Concentrated Solar Power facility: 
the 160MW Ouarzazate I CSP plant. The plant is in the 
final stage of the tendering process and is scheduled 
to move into the construction phase before the end of 
2012.
Challenges facing CSP development
Ouarzazate I’s stakeholders understand that the project 
only makes economic sense as the first in a series of 
CSP installations leading to a large-scale portfolio2 of 
CSP plants in Morocco and the MENA region. 
Building a CSP portfolio represents a ‘chicken or the 
egg’ dilemma: in order to scale up, CSP projects need 
to become increasingly commercially viable — through 
economies of scale or through exports to Europe — 
to attract investment over and above finite public 
resources. But achieving commercial viability first 
requires the development of early projects which need 
higher levels of investment not just for capital costs, but 
also for capacity building and associated grid infrastruc-
tures (such as transmission lines and interconnectors). 
The challenges facing the development of a CSP 
portfolio are financial, technical, and political. They 
include: attracting enough public and private financing; 
1 The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that CSP could provide up 
to 11.3 percent of global electricity by 2050 (IEA 2010).
2 Portfolio here means a series of projects sharing a similar technology and 
linked by a common framework (e.g.: the Morocco Solar Plan, the Mediter-
ranean Solar Plan, the CTF CSP Investment Plan).
successfully deploying early-stage technology; building 
local manufacturing facilities; bringing technology costs 
down; brokering agreements for exports to the E.U.; and 
addressing competitiveness issues when subsidies for 
dirtier technologies create an uneven playing field.
By addressing these issues, the first publicly-supported 
large-scale CSP projects, such as Ouarzazate I, play 
a crucial role in bridging the development of a more 
commercially-sustainable regional CSP market.
Specifically, the Ouarzazate I project had two over-
arching objectives:
1. To install CSP at a scale that sufficiently tests and 
demonstrates the storage technology component, 
triggers important cost reductions, and fosters 
associated economic benefits, such as local 
manufacturing industries, improved energy security, 
and a shift away from fossil fuels; and
2. To test a business model that could attract and 
increase private-sector backing and enhance the 
availability of capital and ‘know-how’ to support the 
development of a CSP portfolio.
The project is still in an early stage, hence this report 
cannot assess whether Ouarzazate I has been success-
ful in meeting the first objective. However, our exami-
nation reveals that, so far, Ouarzazate I has succeeded 
in attracting sufficient financing in its startup phase, 
through a public-private partnership model. This model 
can efficiently allocate risks among key stakeholders in 
the project and may be useful in the development of an 
expanded CSP portfolio.
Key stakeholders in the Ouarzazate I project include:
•	 The Government of Morocco and the Moroccan 
Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN) which are 
expected to contribute approximately USD 883 
million over the life of the plant,3 mostly in the 
form of operational subsidies. Their objectives 
are to support local economic development 
by creating expertise in the solar power sector 
and to improve the country’s energy balance by 
shifting from expensive fossil-fuel imports.
•	 International Finance Institution (IFI) donors 
which have committed in excess of USD 1 billion 
for the construction of the facility in order to 
complete the first key phase of a CSP portfolio 
designed for the MENA region.
3 Including changes in subsidy costs and tax revenues compared to the 
counterfactual.
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•	 A consortium of private developers which will 
contribute USD 190 million of equity capital and 
expertise for an estimated 14 percent after-tax 
rate of return. 
Who Issue Ouarzazate I Responses and Effects
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CSP technology is expensive. Concessional finance lowered the cost for project developers and the Government of Morocco. 
Public resources are limited. 
Building Ouarzazate I is part of a greater strategic plan to replace 
public financial resources for CSP with E.U. export revenues. The 
public-private partnership model has tapped private-sector capital, 
technical expertise, and managerial efficiency.
Infrastructure investments are 
institutionally complex and 
involve high transaction costs.
MASEN has successfully coordinated private and public stake-
holder involvement, with support from multilateral development 
banks. MASEN had to work closely with all concessional lenders 
to coordinate their loan requirements in order to reduce transac-
tion and compliance costs. Loan syndication could further improve 
efficiency of this process. 
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Size of the investment required 
in Ouarzazate I exceeds the 
available resources of a single 
institution.
Seven lenders were brought on board to provide concessional 
financing. 
CSP technology is still far from 
commercial viability.
Ouarzazate I is the initial phase of a regional investment plan to drive 
costs down and develop capabilities for CSP through deployment 
and learning.
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High capital costs, compared 
to alternative power sources, 
make the project financially 
unattractive. 
Support from the Government of Morocco and IFIs make the project 
viable.
Ouarzazate I’s economics are 
overly dependent on support 
from the Government of 
Morocco.
IFIs’ participation provides investor security in the event that the 
Moroccan Government faces budget difficulties. 
Key elements in the design and development of the 
project
This case study identifies five building blocks that were 
essential to get the Ouarzazate I project off the ground. 
1. Strong public support and the close alignment of 
key public partners: The Government of Morocco 
established a favorable regulatory and renewable 
policy framework to encourage private-sector 
engagement. In particular, it established a special-
ized entity tasked with realizing CSP projects 
(MASEN) and financially supports this entity’s 
work to implement the ambitious Moroccan Solar 
Plan. For the Ouarzazate I project, the government 
earmarked funds (of an estimated USD 60 million 
per year) to cover the expected difference between 
the prices at which MASEN will purchase power 
from the generator and sell it onto the grid. A 
comprehensive reform of the fossil-fuel subsidiza-
tion system is also underway but it’s too early to 
comment on its effects.
2. Significant financial and technical contribu-
tions from IFIs: CSP technology is still far from 
commercial viability and together with the very high 
capital costs this meant the project was not viable 
without high levels of international support. Interna-
tional donors and lenders provided around USD 1 
billion of early concessional financing, driving down 
The following table summarizes how Ouarzazate 
I addressed the specific concerns of each of these 
stakeholders.
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levelized costs by an estimated 25-30 percent.4 In 
addition, IFIs provided necessary institutional and 
specialized technical support. Their engagement 
helped to further mitigate private investors’ 
perceived risks.
3. Strong engagement and coordination of donors: 
Early coordination and agreements with donors 
allowed MASEN to clearly indicate the terms 
and costs at which capital would be offered. This 
transparency appears to have supported competi-
tion among private investors, resulting in required 
rate of returns that are in line with other, less risky 
renewable energy projects in the country. It also 
appears to have supported bids in line with or below 
projected levels. However, donor coordination and 
alignment of conditions, safeguards, and reporting 
rules was time-consuming and challenging.
4. A carefully designed public-private partner-
ship model: The public-private partnership model 
allows the optimal alignment of risk between public 
and private players. For example, in Ouarzazate 
I, the private developer bears construction and 
operational risk while the Government of Morocco 
bears electricity market risk (revenue risk). 
MASEN’s role in the public-private partnership is 
innovative: It acts as both equity investor and power 
purchaser (off-taker) and thus has the ability to 
align public and private objectives. Ouarzazate’s 
development and operation will show whether this 
alignment will be realized.
5. A project design built on past lessons learned: 
Ouarzazate I benefited from exchanges with other 
large-scale CSP projects that are in development 
in India and South Africa, as well as experience 
gained from a CSP project supported by the Global 
Environment Facility. Learning from the design and 
implementation of other CSP projects helps reduce 
project costs and increase efficiencies. This in turn 
will support Morocco and the MENA region to 
develop a CSP portfolio.
Scaling up the CSP portfolio in Morocco 
and the MENA region 
These five building blocks provide useful experience 
for future projects but the Ouarzazate I model will only 
go so far in establishing a large-scale portfolio of CSP 
projects in Morocco and the MENA region. To reach 
4 Financial elaboration based on initial projections. The exact impact will 
be known only when the winning bid is selected and the amount of each 
concessional loan is confirmed.
the scale desired by the Moroccan and Mediterranean 
Plans, the CSP portfolio will require a significant amount 
of additional capital. Given the scarcity of public and 
international funds, more commercially-oriented financ-
ing models will be necessary. These commercially-ori-
ented financing models will most likely require:
1. Reduced technology/project costs through 
economies of scale; and
2. Higher market revenues, such as E.U. export 
revenues.
By 2020, economies of scale are expected to reduce 
technology costs, but not to the level required to reach 
grid parity in Morocco and the MENA region. Were 
the Government of Morocco to succeed in phasing out 
fossil-fuel subsidies, this would further reduce—though 
not eliminate—the competitiveness gap between CSP 
and high-carbon alternatives.
It is rather feasible that renewable power exports to 
European markets could fill the remaining gap in the 
medium- to long-term. However, considerable political 
support will be crucial to secure E.U. Member States’ 
demand and to broker specific agreements that make 
the exports a reality. Interestingly, the possibility of 
exporting power presents a trade-off between finan-
cial viability on the one hand, and domestic energy 
and environmental effects on the other. While power 
exports significantly lighten the financial burden of 
Ouarzazate I on the Moroccan national budget, they 
also reduce the amount of fossil-fuel electricity dis-
placed in the country, and therefore, the energy secu-
rity and environmental benefits associated with CSP. 
Instead, Morocco would gain export revenues and 
economic development.
Scaling up a CSP portfolio in the MENA region and else-
where in the world will be challenging, given the high 
costs of developing early projects and the necessary 
infrastructure to support them. The Ouarzazate case 
indicates that financing specific projects is possible with 
the close alignment of public, international, and private 
stakeholders, and careful design and coordination. Such 
an achievement, however, may not be enough to scale 
up a national or regional portfolio. This greater goal may 
be met only if projects are commercially viable, through 
a reduction in costs and access to higher market rev-
enues, both of which will require considerable political 
support from national and international players.
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Introduction
In October 2011, Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) and the 
World Bank Group, in collaboration with China Light 
& Power (CLP) and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), launched the 
San Giorgio Group, a new working group of key finan-
cial intermediaries and institutions actively engaged in 
providing green, low-emissions finance.5 
The San Giorgio Group recognizes that a major barrier 
to scaling up climate investment flows is the limited 
availability and understanding of empirical evidence 
or ‘on-the-ground’ examples of financial practices, 
environmental policies, and political signals that drive 
green investment. The goal of the San Giorgio Group 
is to fill this gap by drawing on the experience of its 
members to track and analyze the life cycle of existing 
projects, programs, and portfolios, and assess results 
and mechanisms that affect financial and environmental 
performance of these investments. Through this, we 
aim to distill lessons about evolving financing practices, 
provide insights on how to scale up climate finance, and 
spend resources more wisely. 
Our analysis is framed by four overarching questions:
•	 What is the role of public finance?
•	 How can public money be best delivered 
(instruments and institutional channels)?
•	 How do we ensure the alignment of interna-
tional and national public investment flows with 
private investment flows?
•	 How can we ensure effective investment and 
continued learning?
5 For additional information see CPI website, http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/
event/inaugural-meeting-of-the-san-giorgio-group/.
The San Giorgio Group case studies share a systematic 
analytical framework. They explore in depth the role 
of project stakeholders, the sources of return for the 
various stakeholders, the risks involved and arrange-
ments to deal with them, and case-specific develop-
ments and lessons in replicating and scaling up best 
practices. 
We explore the questions above through the 
Ouarzazate I Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) project in 
Morocco. This project is an example of how a public-pri-
vate partnership (PPP) model can support risk sharing 
between the public and private sectors, given that CSP 
is an expensive early development stage technology and 
the ambitions to develop a much larger portfolio of CSP 
in Morocco and the region. 
Section 2 introduces Ouarzazate I and its key stakehold-
ers, providing an overview of the context in which the 
project has developed. Section 3 examines the project 
economics, looking at the costs and benefits of the 
project as a whole and from each key stakeholder’s 
perspective. In Section 4, we review the risks involved 
in the project and explore the tools and design aspects 
that have mitigated or transferred those risks. Section 
5 focuses on the public-private partnership model 
employed by the project, looking at how risks have been 
shared between the key parties involved in the project 
that include the Government of Morocco, international 
donors, and a private-sector consortium. Section 5 also 
considers the role of international donors and describes 
the process involved in engaging those international 
donors in the project. Section 6 draws out key lessons 
from Ouarzazate I that could be applied to similar large-
scale CSP projects in the region and considers whether 
Ouarzazate is replicable and scalable.
 2A CPI Report
San Giorgio Group Case Study: Ouarzazate I MoroccoAugust 2012
An overview of Ouarzazate I
Project background
To meet fast growing demand for electricity, Morocco 
needs to double its power generation capacity by 2020. 
This substantial challenge is compounded by Morocco’s 
high reliance on energy imports that currently account 
for 97 percent of total supply. To address the twin 
challenges of improving energy security and promoting 
sustainable development, the Government of Morocco 
announced a new energy strategy in 20106 and estab-
lished the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN). 
The strategy established a set of overarching goals to: 
•	 reduce reliance on oil to 40 percent of energy 
consumption by 2030; 
•	 increase energy efficiency, inducing energy 
savings of 15 percent by 2020 and 25 percent 
by 2030; and
•	 increase renewable power generating capacity 
to 42 percent of  installed power generating  
capacity by 2020, through the commissioning 
of an additional 6000 MW of wind, solar and 
hydro. 
Also in 2009, the Government of Morocco launched the 
Morocco Solar Plan and set a goal to install 2000 MW 
of solar power capacity by 2020 through five concen-
trated solar power projects. The government committed 
to finance the cost of the Plan and set up MASEN to 
develop the projects, starting with the first phase of the 
Ouarzazate 500 MW concentrated solar power (CSP) 
plant, Ouarzazate I, in Morocco. 
Unlike many other developing countries, private produc-
ers already generate more than 50 percent of the coun-
try’s total electricity needs (CDER, 2009).7 Building on 
this, the government aims to make private production 
6 The government of Morocco promulgated both the 13-09 Renewable 
Energy Law and the 57-09 MASEN Law in March 2010 (see Figure 1 for more 
details).
7 Three contracts of concessions with guarantee of purchase signed directly 
by each independent producer (IPP) with ONE have been in operation for 
several years: Jorf Lasfar Energy Company (Coal), Compagnie Wind of the 
Strait (Wind) and Electric Power of Tahaddart (Natural Gas) (ENPI, 2011).
the cornerstone of its two ambitious renewable energy 
installation programs: (1) the 1000 MW Integrated 
Wind Energy Program; and (2) the 2000 MW Morocco 
Solar Plan. Both investment programs will be developed 
using a public-private partnership model to gradually 
attract private capital into the country’s fledgling renew-
able energy market. If successful, Ouarzazate could 
become a business model for future CSP projects, both 
in Morocco and the Mediterranean region. 
CSP technology is a potentially reliable source of 
renewable power in regions with high ‘Direct Normal 
Radiance’ (DNI), or solar incidence, particularly if 
storage can extend supply to cover peak evening 
demand periods. CSP components are not intrinsi-
cally expensive and as experience builds, costs are 
expected to fall (WB, 2011a). However CSP is still at the 
commercial-demonstration stage—the basic technol-
ogy is proven but critical energy-storage components 
require further demonstration.8 As a result, CSP costs 
remain high and uncertain compared to other forms of 
power generation and producers and investors are not 
yet ready to develop projects without substantial public 
support.
Currently, several Middle East and North African 
(MENA) countries,9 South Africa, Australia,10 China11 
and India are all developing CSP projects, in many 
cases with the support of International Financial 
Intermediaries (IFIs) (Kulichenko and Wirth, 2011). 
However, to date, Spain and the United States have the 
most significant experience with CSP.12
8 Abengoa of Spain is currently developing a large-scale 280 MW CSP plant 
in Arizona that will feature a six-hours molten salt storage component—the 
plant will begin operation in 2013 (Abengoa, 2012). In the case of Ouarza-
zate I, there is a high risk associated with the freezing of molten salt which 
will be used as the heat transfer and storage fluid (WB, 2011a).
9 Including three combined gas-solar thermal plants with 20MW of solar 
power: Ain Beni Mathar in Morocco supported by a USD 43 million Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) grant; Hassi-R’mel in Algeria financed by the 
Government of Algeria; Al Kuraymat in Egypt, with support from GEF and 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
10 Australian Solar Flagships Program.
11 In January 2011, Chinese authorities selected a developer to build a 50 MW 
CSP plant in Inner Mongolia.
12 Kulichenko and Wirth (2011) estimate that 1000 MWe of parabolic trough 
•	 Ouarzazate I is the first step in an ambitious plan to create a portfolio of CSP investments in Morocco and the 
MENA region. 
•	 An attractive mix of policy incentives and international concessional finance under a public-private partnership 
model has been designed to attract private investors/developers.
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Morocco and the MENA region have high CSP potential. 
With high solar incidence and proximity to E.U. markets, 
ambitious plans to export energy to E.U. markets are 
already in development. Country-led and/or regional 
plans in place or under development include: the E.U. 
funded Mediterranean Solar Plan to install 20GW of 
capacity on the south shore of the Mediterranean; the 
Desertec Industrial Initiative (DII) which aims to create 
a market for renewable power from the MENA region; 
Medgrid which aims to develop interconnections to 
deliver up to 5GW of Saharan solar energy to Europe by 
2020; and the World Bank Arab World Initiative which 
aims for greater regional cooperation between Arab 
countries. Complementing these, the Clean Technology 
Fund’s (CTF)13 “Investment Plan for Concentrated Solar 
Power for the MENA Region” led by the World Bank and 
the African Development Bank has catalytic poten-
tial with plans to install 1.2 GW across Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.14 
CSP was operational in 2012. They report much lower installed capacities 
of other CSP technologies (10 MWe or lower of each of the other main CSP 
technologies including Fresnel Trough, Molten Salt Solar Tower, Water Steam 
Solar Team and Parabolic Dish). Of the parabolic trough projects, the United 
States appears to be hosting the greatest installed capacity (354 MWe in 
the famous SEGS plant in the Mohave Desert and 324 MWe in recently built 
plants), followed by Spain (550 MWe across three sites, mostly already 
commissioned), and the UAE (100 MWe on one site). One further project in 
the pipeline in the United States would however add a further 1000 MWe.
13 The Clean Technology Fund (CTF) is one of two multi-donor Trust Funds 
within the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs). It promotes scaled-up financing 
for demonstration, deployment and transfer of low-carbon technologies 
with significant potential for long-term greenhouse-gas emissions sav-
ings. Funds are channelled through the African Development Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Inter-American Development Bank, and World Bank Group. The CTF finances 
12 country programs (called Investment Plans) and one regional program 
(the MENA CSP Investment Plan). The World Bank is the Trustee and Admin-
istrating Unit of the CTF Trust Fund (ODI/Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2012).
14 The Investment Plan represents approximately 15 percent of the projected 
global pipeline of CSP projects and, if realized, would almost double the 
current global installed capacity of CSP.
The long-term vision of these initiatives is to promote 
the development of an economically sound CSP market 
that could foster associated social benefits. The steps 
along the way constitute a critical series of building 
blocks. To lay the foundations of such a market, the 
Government of Morocco and a selection of IFIs have 
committed substantial concessional finance to develop 
early CSP projects such as Ouarzazate I. However, 
a functioning market may still be some years away. 
Moving from a fragmented approach toward a portfolio 
approach would speed up achievement of this vision in 
the region. 
Along with other large-scale CSP projects the primary 
higher-level objective of the institutions backing 
Ouarzazate I is to install CSP at a scale that suffi-
ciently tests and demonstrates the storage technology 
component, and triggers important CSP cost reduc-
tions. Other factors will also help reduce costs including 
building up experience with the public-private partner-
ship model, achieving economies of scale, and improv-
ing technology (WB, 2011a). 
Other higher-level objectives include promoting green 
growth and local economic development by building 
up Morocco’s renewable energy industry, improving 
Morocco’s energy security, shifting subsidies and the 
Moroccan energy system away from fossil fuels and 
reducing Morocco’s trade deficit. In addition to building 
CSP capacity, interconnections and development of a 
sizeable regional electricity market, with the possibility 
to export power to more lucrative E.U. markets, will be 
important to spur the development of a local industry at 
scale.
The Moroccan Government is an early mover and 
hopes to benefit from its contribution to the develop-
ment of the CSP market in the region. To do so, it will 
be crucial to learn early lessons from projects being 
developed and to keep an eye on the long-term objec-
tives of the portfolio. 
Ouarzazate I is concentrated solar power project financed by the Clean Technology Fund, 
International Finance Institutions, and the Government of Morocco. The project will be devel-
oped through a public-private partnership by a Special Purpose Vehicle—a consortium of private 
developers and the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN). The project is made possible 
through a substantial subsidy from the Government of Morocco, in the form of a power purchase 
agreement covering the expected 25-year lifetime of the project. The plant will have a capacity 
of between 125 and 160 MW and will use the most mature CSP technology currently available—
parabolic trough—with three hours of molten salt thermal energy storage capacity. Construction 
of the plant is expected to start before the end of 2012.
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Project details
A public-private partnership has been designed to 
manage and finance Ouarzazate I, drawing together 
private developers and/or investors and IFIs. The 
partnership incorporates Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPAs), and sets the terms for a large amount of 
concessional finance provided by the Government of 
Morocco and IFIs, some of which has been distributed 
via the Clean Technology Fund (CTF). This model allows 
the government to share costs and risks with interna-
tional and private financiers  and project developers. It 
also helps to drive overall costs down. 
MASEN, the solar energy agency established by the 
Moroccan Government, plays a key role linking the 
project company and the governmental support for 
the project. It is currently offering private partners/
consortia to take a 75 percent equity stake against its 
25 percent equity stake in the Solar Power Company 
(SPC) special purpose vehicle, which will develop the 
project. The SPC/PPP partners are expected to take 
a total equity stake of approximately USD 253 mil-
lion.15 Under the first of two 25-year PPAs, MASEN will 
purchase power from the SPC at the cost of the power 
generated. Under the second PPA,16 the Office National 
de l’Electricité of Morocco (ONE)17 will buy all power 
from MASEN, at the grid price, and dispatch it from the 
plant.18
The Government of Morocco has agreed to finance the 
costs of the Moroccan Solar Plan through a convention 
which guarantees the financial stability of MASEN. A 
project specific convention specifies the support to be 
provided for Ouarzazate I to compensate MASEN for 
the price difference between the two PPAs. This repre-
sents the incremental cost of the CSP technology for the 
Moroccan market—and initial projections estimate this 
subsidy to reach around USD 60 million per year (WB, 
2011a).
15  The SPC/public-private partnership is estimated to earmark USD 253 million 
as equity for construction and (MASEN only) USD 126 million to build associ-
ated facilities (WB, 2011a).
16  In the rest of the document, this second PPA is referred as Power Sale 
Agreement (PSA).
17 Following the merger with the Office National de l’Eau Potable (ONEP) in 
April 2012 ONE has been renamed Office National de l’Eau et de l’Electricite 
(ONEE)..
18  Morocco has a relatively stable political and regulatory environment and the 
PPA model goes even further to lower risks for potential private investors 
(Norton Rose, 2010).
To date, IFIs have pledged over USD 1 billion in conces-
sional loans to support construction costs and a further 
USD 200 million loan which provides the Government 
of Morocco with a safety net should it be unable to 
financially support the subsidy to MASEN.19
Importantly, without the Government of Morocco’s 
agreement to fund the substantial viability gap and con-
cessional financing terms provided by IFIs, the project 
would not be a viable investment prospect.
Project timeline
Figure 1 charts key project milestones and the roles 
of individual stakeholders. Commitments from IFIs to 
provide concessional finance20 and agreements speci-
fying support from the Government of Morocco to 
meet the viability gap and for the Office National de 
l’Electricité of Morocco (ONE) to purchase power were 
all laid out well in advance of the release of the request 
for proposals for a private development partner. Three 
full proposals from private-partner consortia are cur-
rently under consideration.
Project stakeholders
A broad group of international, national, government 
and non-government stakeholders are involved in 
Ouarzazate I. Based on publicly available sources of 
information, Figure 2 categorizes and maps the finan-
cial links between the stakeholders involved in the 
Ouarzazate I project. This case study identifies three 
main groups of stakeholders involved in the project: 
the Government of Morocco and governmental bodies 
(including MASEN and ONE), SPC equity providers/the 
private consortium, and IFIs providing grants and loans. 
Table 1 lists in detail the stakeholders that have contrib-
uted to the project, focusing on their financing role.
19  In addition, the German Ministry of Environment (BMU), has pledged a 
grant of USD 19 million and European Commission Neighbourhood Invest-
ment Facility (EC NIF) a grant of USD 37 million. 
20  Announcement dates for commitments to the project by IFIs are not shown 
in the timeline due to lack of available data. Instead commitments are plot-
ted according to official approval dates.
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Figure 1: Ouarzazate I Concentrated Solar Power project timeline
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EC-NIF EUR 30m grant
KfW/BMZ EUR 100m loan
AfDB $ 100m investment
AfDB EUR 200m loan
Expression of Interest (200 responses)
Prequalification phase (19 parties responded)
Request for Proposals (4 prequalified parties)
Technical bid submissions
Final RFP
Financial bid submissions
Winning bidder announcement
Infrastructure work
Construction work
Plant operation
Ouarzazate I land mobilization and site qualification
2020 2030 2040 20502009 2010 2011 2012
DURATION OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT 
APPROVAL
 6A CPI Report
San Giorgio Group Case Study: Ouarzazate I MoroccoAugust 2012
Stakeholder Description and role Financing role
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f M
or
oc
co
 
Moroccan 
state
• Shareholder in MASEN
Subsidizes difference between two 
PPAs present in the project through 
the State Budget
Ministry of 
interior • Manages special community fund N/A
Masen
• Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy 
• Limited liability company (LLC) with the Moroccan State, ONE, Fonds Hassan II 
and the Société d’Investissements Energétique (SIE) as equal shareholders
• Responsible for managing bidding process and selection of private consortium
• Monitor SPC
• Ownership of the CSP plant upon commissioning
• Semi-annual financial reports, independent annual audit and progress reporting 
to donors (financial statements, physical progress and procurement)
• Support R&D, training and technical innovation
• Implementation of the FESMP1
• Finance and manage the 
Associated Facilities (for water 
supply, grid connections and land)
• 25 percent equity stake in the SPC
• Onward lends IFI debt and 
manages reporting to IFIs
onee
• Office National de l’Eau et de l’Electricité incorporating Office National de 
L’Electricité and Office National de l’Eau Potable
• Construction of the transmission lines and water supply infrastructures
• Power dispatch, transmission, and distribution
• Environmental Management Plan for transmission lines and water supply
• Shareholder in MASEN
Required to purchase all power gener-
ated by the plant from MASEN
Pr
iv
at
e
Private 
consortiuM
• Project implementation including design, construction and performance 
optimization of the plant
• Preparation and implementation of project specific ESIA and ESMP,2 financial 
reporting
• Project Implementing Entity
75 percent equity stake in the SPC
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l d
on
or
s
afDB • African Development Bank
• Channel CTF financing
• Provide additional     concessional 
financing towards construction
WBG/iBrD
• World Bank Group and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
• Support to MASEN and Government of Morocco to initiate the project
• Channel CTF financing
• Provide additional concessional 
financing to support Government’s 
PPA subsidy
eiB
• European Investment Bank
• Coordinates European donors 
Concessional finance provider
afD, KfW/
BMZ
• L’Agence Française de Développement, German Development Bank and German 
Development Cooperation
Co-lenders linked to EC NIF grant
BMu, ec nif
• German Ministry of Environment, European Commission Neighbourhood 
Investment Facility
Grant providers
1 The Framework Environmental and Social Management Plan (FESMP) includes institutional settings, general mitigation measures and a monitoring plan for the 
potential impacts expected from project activities during construction and operation stages (WB, 2011a).
2 Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) is to be carried out by the SPC and include a detailed Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) 
(WB, 2011a).
Sources: various.
Table 1 Stakeholders description and role 
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Figure 2: Ouarzazate I Stakeholder M
apping
Source: CPI com
piled this inform
ation from
 various sources. Carbon finance and technology are 
blocked out at present due to lack of available inform
ation.
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Investment, return, and 
profitability of Ouarzazate I
This section addresses two main San Giorgio Group 
questions: What are the public and private financial inputs 
and what are the main outcomes of Ouarzazate I? To 
assess the return profile of the Ouarzazate I project, we 
first consider the total project costs broken down across 
equity and debt contributors and across project phases. 
Then, we estimate returns and profitability at the overall 
project level and those accruing to each project con-
tributor. Finally, in order to assess if money has been 
invested wisely, we apply CPI’s emerging Effectiveness 
Framework to identify causal relationships between 
inputs (for example policy incentives and financing) 
and relevant outcomes. To the extent possible, given 
available data, we attempt to quantify impacts that will 
derive from the investment.
We have performed all our analyses on the basis of 
initial projections and estimates of the project sponsors 
and concessional financiers. In the past few months, 
project developers have submitted bids but, at the time 
of writing (August 2012), a winning bid had yet to be 
announced and the exact content of individual bids 
remained uncertain. Hence, we have relied on initial 
financial metrics, projections and charts to inform our 
overarching analysis. For a limited number of metrics 
(i.e. capital expenses, levelized cost of energy [LCOE], 
governmental subsidies), we have calculated results 
implied by the estimates of the lowest bid.
Project costs and sources of return
Project costs
Expected project development and operational costs 
are presented in Figure 3 below.21 Project development 
21 This case study’s estimated value is based on the initial projections. As with 
most of the financial estimates, the final amounts will be known only once 
costs include around USD 3 million22 for land and USD 
126 million for associated facilities (water connections, 
transmission lines, and other infrastructure require-
ments such as access roads).23 
Ouarzazate capital expenses (CAPEX) were originally 
estimated at between USD 960 million and USD 1,304 
million.24 However, the lowest bid received during the 
tender process indicates a much lower figure: between 
USD 700 and USD 800 million.25 The component 
contributions to CAPEX were initially estimated at 
62 percent for the solar system (field and heat trans-
fer fluid), 21 percent for the power block, 13 percent 
for storage, and 4 percent for site preparation. The 
expected equity to debt ratio for the project is 20:80. 
MASEN estimates that operating expenses (OPEX) 
will amount to approximately 11 percent of gross annual 
revenues, which we assume includes costs for lease of 
water, land, and road infrastructures and should amount 
to approximately USD 26/MWh.26 
the winning bid is selected.
22 Land was purchased by MASEN via ONE from the community and will 
subsequently be leased to the SPC. 
23 Funded by the Government of Morocco via MASEN, then leased to the SPC.
24 Original estimated investment cost was USD 6000/kW (WB, 2011a, p.95), 
resulting in USD 960 million for 160 MW installed. Sum of contributions 
for construction components, as reported in various sources, is USD 1,304 
million, building in some room for contingency. 
25 In April 2012, Project Finance Magazine reported: “The Acwapower/Aries/
TSK consortium submitted a bid of USD 0.189711/kWh – around 30 percent 
below the other two bidders. The Enel Green Power/ACS Cobra consortium 
bid USD 0.244235/kWh and Abengoa/Taqa/Mitsui bid USD 0.244271/
kWh, while the Solar Millenium/Orascom consortium did not bid” (Project 
Finance, 2012). Inserting the lowest bid in our financial model provides an 
estimated investment cost between 3,500 and 4,000 USD/kW(almost 40 
percent lower than projected), a new LCOE of USD 194/MWh, and a gov-
ernmental subsidy required of USD 40 million per year. Our estimate of the 
subsidy required is based on strong assumptions regarding likely wholesale 
electricity prices in Morocco (see footnote 30 for further information).
26 Based on initial projections (WB, 2011a). .
 • The Government of Morocco provides a subsidy that will cover the difference between the price at 
which MASEN buys, and then sells power. This subsidy is essential for the project’s viability. Without it, 
CSP technology is still too expensive for the local market as the price of power generated is substantially 
higher than local grid prices. 
 • The Solar Power Company’s revenue stream is heavily subsidized by the Government of Morocco and by 
IFIs’ concessional finance. 
 • The Government of Morocco and IFIs are betting on the project’s contribution to the development of a 
CSP market in the region that will bring longer term and broader economic benefits.
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At the time of writing (August 2012), financing costs 
for the SPC were unknown; they will be determined by 
the extent to which MASEN passes on the terms of IFI 
concessional loans. Based on lenders’ indications, our 
financial modeling estimates a blended interest rate 
for the overall IFI concessional financing of approxi-
mately 3.1 percent.27 Figure 4, below, compares this to a 
commercial interest rate of 9 percent (Kulichenko and 
Wirth, 2011) and highlights the impact of this cheaper 
debt provided by IFIs on the project cash flow stream 
(the aqua-colored area).
Expected generation and levelized cost of 
energy (LCOE)28 calculations
Ouarzazate I is expected to produce an average 370 
27 This case study assumes that all concessional financing from IFIs is passed 
on directly from MASEN to the SPC. At the time of writing, the pre-
announced terms were as follows (AfDB, 2012b): Clean Technology Fund’s 
‘softer’ concessional: 0.25 percent service charge and an embedded grant 
element of 75 percent; AFD: 4 percent interest rate, 17 years maturity with 
4 years grace; AfDB: 4 percent interest rate, 20 years maturity with 5 years 
grace; EIB: 4 percent interest rate, 23 years maturity with 3 years grace; KfW: 
2.5 percent interest rate, 15 years maturity with 3 years grace.
28 By a levelized cost, it is meant the (present value of) total project costs for 
each kWh of energy generated by the CSP. This provides a single, ag-
gregated measure of costs associated with energy production that can be 
compared across technologies (Varadarajan et al., 2011). The LCOE method 
calculates the levelized cost of energy to the final user by actualizing all cash 
flows related to a specific energy source. Consistent with previous CPI re-
GWh of power per year for 25 years, following three 
years of construction. We estimate levelized cost of 
energy (LCOE) using the initial projections for capital 
expenses, the estimated value of the PPA and Power 
Sales Agreement (PSA), together with assumptions 
about the timing of cash flows and a blended rate of 3.1 
percent for financing. Based on these factors, the LCOE 
is calculated at approximately USD 245/MWh.29 Capital 
expenses account for 90 percent of costs, and operat-
ing expenses for 10 percent.
International donors and concessional lenders clearly 
have a substantial impact on the project’s LCOE by 
providing up-front lower-cost financing. For example, if 
we replaced all concessional financing with commercial 
capital at a blended rate of 9 percent (Kulichenko and 
Wirth, 2011) the resulting LCOE would be approximately 
30 percent higher, or USD 320/MWh. 
Given national grid prices of approximately USD 81/
MWh, without concessional financing and continuous 
revenue support from MASEN, it would be impossible 
ports, the calculation has been based on the expected after-tax internal rate 
of return of the project, based on anticipated cost and revenue estimates.
29 This LCOE estimation appears consistent with the our estimation for PPA 
price indicated by the project financiers (WB, 2011a), as well as estimates 
from the European Investment Bank (EIB) for CSP technology in MENA (EIB, 
2010) and the projections from European Solar Thermal Electricity Associa-
tion, Estela (ATKearney, 2010).
Finance TypeSource Project Costs
Solar 
incremental cost 
component
$1,392
Subsidy
$1,192
Loans
$1,195
Equity
$253
Construction 
of the Plant
$1,304
As
so
cia
te
d F
ac
ilit
ies
 $
12
6
Notes: Total burden on the Government of Morocco does not include fuel subsidies saved and tax revenues (netted figure estimated around USD883 million). Com-
mitments in original currency (where not USD) are: EIB €250 million, AfDB €200 million, AFD €100 million, BMU €15 million, EC-NIF €30 million. Sources: World 
Bank (2011a), CIF (2011a), and AfDB (2012b).
CTF(IBRD)
$97
CTF(AfDB)
$100
GoM
$1,192
IB
RD
 $
20
0
AFD
$123
KfW/
BMZ
$123
AfDB
$245
EIB
$307
EC/NIF
$37
KfW/BMU
$19
M
AS
EN
/G
oM
 $
12
6
PPP
$253
Grants
$182
Figure 3: Attribution of project costs by source, financing type, and cost component (amounts in millions of USD)
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for CSP to compete with lower-cost alternatives. Even 
if high government fossil-fuel subsidies were removed 
and national grid prices rose to USD 113/MWh, the cost 
differentials would still be difficult to overcome. (Please 
see Box 1 for a more detailed discussion of fossil-fuel 
subsidies.) 
Project sources of return 
The SPC’s main source of return will be from electric-
ity sales to MASEN via the PPA. We estimate the price 
for this at approximately USD 244/MWh. While the 
terms and the projections of the PPA between the SPC 
and MASEN are confidential, we estimate its value by 
adding MASEN’s projection of the government subsidy 
(USD 60 million per year for the duration of the project) 
to our estimate of the PSA between MASEN and ONE. 
This case study assumes that the PSA will be linked to 
the Moroccan market’s prevailing power price and, in 
practice, will be driven by coal generation prices. It has 
not been disclosed whether the PSA price will be fixed 
for 25 years or if it will be indexed to the grid price over 
time. Taking current industrial electricity tariffs in the 
country as a benchmark, we estimate the PSA will be 
set at a price of $81/MWh. This assumes that ONE 
does not place any margin on power purchased from 
MASEN before selling it.30
30 This assumption derives from considering that both ONE and MASEN are 
public entities owned by the state and that any margin charged by ONE onto 
electricity sold to MASEN would have to be compensated by the govern-
ment itself via the convention with MASEN. Given limited availability of data 
on wholesale electricitytariffs in Morocco or on the likely rate of the PSA 
Overall Project Return
Assuming 25 years of operation, a degradation factor31 
of 0.5 percent per year, an annual escalation factor for 
both operation expenditures and PPA of 2.6 percent,32 
and a corporate tax rate of 30 percent, we estimate the 
pre-tax internal rate of return (IRR) at 9 percent and the 
after-tax, levered IRR for the SPC at 13.6 percent (taking 
into consideration the 80:20 leverage factor at project 
level). This figure compares closely with reported IRR 
benchmarks for renewable energy generation under 
another concessional scheme for wind energy in 
Morocco (Attijari, 2010).33 
The cash flow profile over the lifetime of the project, 
based on the assumed project costs and revenues, 
is illustrated in Figure 4. The lower half of the graph 
shows the high upfront capital costs of the project in 
the first three years, as financed by debt, equity and, 
to a lesser extent, grants. Other costs, spread over the 
duration of the project are also shown, including operat-
ing and financing costs. In terms of sources of project 
revenue (on the upper half), the figure shows the crucial 
between ONE and MASEN, we assume a PSA of 81 USD/MWh, based on 
electricity tariff data published online by the Moroccan Investment Develop-
ment Agency (MIDA, 2012).
31 The degradation factor is the annual power generation loss due to continu-
ous aging and fatigue of the equipment. 
32 Inflation rate forecast from IMF.
33 Attijari Finance Corp reported benchmarks vary according to the chosen 
business model, from the less risky generation under a concessional scheme 
with ONE (10-12 percent IRR), to the generation directly from ONE (11-12 
percent), to self production (greater than 12 percent).
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support provided by 
the Government of 
Morocco to make 
the project profitable 
by filling the viability 
gap between high-
cost CSP power and 
the marginal costs of 
power production, and 
also shows the income 
flowing from ONE to 
MASEN for the sale of 
power to the grid. The 
figure also illustrates 
savings for the SPC as 
a result of the conces-
sional financing terms 
- actual financing 
expenses (FINEX) - as 
compared to coun-
terfactual commer-
cial financing terms 
(aqua). 
Returns to 
individual project 
contributors
The expansion of CSP technology in Morocco is geared 
toward meeting multiple objectives and delivering 
multiple benefits. Table 2 summarizes both direct and 
indirect (portfolio-related) returns to project contribu-
tors followed by a discussion of these returns.
Government of Morocco
The Government of Morocco is investing heavily in 
the Ouarzazate I project through an annual subsidy 
(estimated at around USD 60 million per year), chan-
neled through MASEN. The purpose of this ongoing 
subsidy is to fund the viability gap between the price 
MASEN pays to purchase power from the SPC, and the 
price at which it sells power to ONE. The Government 
of Morocco is betting that long-term economic benefits 
or higher-level objectives, that would be triggered with 
a move towards a CSP market in the region, will more 
than compensate for its early investment.
The Government of Morocco is also set to receive 
some revenue streams through its equity holding in 
MASEN, as well as tax revenues associated with the 
SPC, new industries and/or jobs. Figure 5 illustrates 
this balance of costs and benefits. The top half of the 
graph shows sources of revenue and budget savings 
for the Government of Morocco, including tax receipts, 
return on investment (as a stakeholder in MASEN) and 
savings derived from fossil-fuel subsidies displaced by 
Ouarzazate I. We assume that under a business-as-
usual scenario, fossil fuel subsidies will be halved by 
2020 and phased out entirely by 2025. The bottom half 
of Figure 5 shows costs incurred by the government, 
including through its contribution to the capital cost and 
the incremental-cost subsidy.
One of the Government of Morocco’s primary higher-
level objectives is to capitalize on its early mover 
advantage by becoming a hub for the CSP manufactur-
ing and generation industry which could be a driver 
for long-term economic development. Evidence of the 
Government of Morocco’s effort to embed longer-term 
goals in the project design includes MASEN’s request 
for private developers to include local content valued 
at 30 percent of the plant capital costs in their bids.34 
Bidders are free to choose how to fulfil this request but 
MASEN suggests the following options: (1) indirect 
investment in a renewable energy manufacturing, oper-
ations and maintenance, engineering or R&D facility; (2) 
direct local procurement of goods and services; or (3) a 
combination or both. 
34 WB, 2011a
Gov’t of 
Morocco Masen
sPc equity 
holDers1
ifis General 
PuBlic
Financial 
returns / 
benefits
incoMe froM solar 
Generation (PPa) √ √
concessional PuBlic 
finance
√ √ √ √
viaBility GaP2 suBsiDy √ √
carBon MarKet revenues √ √
avoiDeD suBsiDy anD 
iMPort costs √ √
taxes √
Non-
financial 
returns / 
benefits
Greenhouse-Gas savinGs √ √
technoloGy-cost 
reDuction
√ √ √ √ √
learninG √ √ √ √
Green GroWth √ √ √ √
Green joBs √ √ √ √ √
enerGy security √ √ √
1 Private consortium plus MASEN.
2 Viability gap is defined as the difference between the PPA price paid from MASEN to the SPC and the PSA price paid from 
ONE to MASEN multiplied by the annual power generated.
Table 2: Stakeholder benefits
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The CTF’s impact indicators project that Ouarzazate I 
will have little if any discernible impact on local indus-
try development, employment, and CSP cost reduc-
tion (WB, 2011a). However, combined with its second 
and third phases, Ouarzazate is expected to initiate 
local industrial development activities and to generate 
some local servicing and maintenance jobs. Moreover, 
Morocco’s Solar Plan as a whole is expected to create 
significant local and national industrial benefits. A 
World Bank-commissioned study on the potential to 
manufacture CSP components locally in the MENA 
region35 makes the following projections based on an 
assumed level of installed capacity of 2GW of CSP by 
2020 and local content of about 30 percent in 2015, 50 
percent in 2020 and 60 percent in 2025:
•	 creation of USD 4.6 billion of cumulated value 
add by 2020;
•	 creation of up to 11,000 full-time equivalent jobs 
in construction, manufacturing and operations 
and maintenance by 2020; and
•	 more than USD 3 billion of cumulated export 
revenues by 2020.
35 Gazzo et al. (2011) 
The project will also help to shift subsidies, and the 
overall Moroccan energy system, away from fossil 
fuels. ONE’s analysis estimates the government will 
save approximately USD 64 million in subsidies over 
the lifetime of the project.36 In the first few years of 
the project, this corresponds to approximately USD 
8.5 million/year saved, compared to the Government 
of Morocco’s total annual fossil-fuel subsidies cost 
of between USD 1 and 4.3 billion (2009-2011). Most 
of the value of the fossil-fuel subsidy savings derives 
from Ouarzazate I’s storage technology, which allows 
Ouarzazate I to displace (imported and expensive) oil-
based generation used to fulfill peak demand. 
The Government of Morocco will also benefit from 
expected CO2 savings of around 240 kt per year (valued 
between USD 1.2 and 3 million per year).37 The eco-
36 Amounts of fossil fuel displaced (in the baseline scenario) have been 
estimated by ONE and valued at the following prices and quantities: Coal: 
32,000 tons at 150 USD/ton; Natural Gas: 354,000 mbtu at 10 USD/mbtu; 
Fuel Oil: 67,000 tons at 450 USD/ton. The estimate assumes that the 
Government of Morocco follows through on its subsidies phasing-out policy.
37 This assumes a displacement of the average electricity fuel mix (18 percent 
coal, 15 percent natural gas, and 67 percent fuel oil) although it is hoped that 
the use of storage technology will enable the plant to also displace peak 
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Box 1: Fossil-Fuel Subsidies in Morocco
Moroccan electricity generation largely relies on heavily subsidized, imported fossil fuels. Both fossil fuels 
and electricity are sold to the consumer below the cost of supply through a compensation system financed 
directly and indirectly (through the state utility) by the state. Over the past three years (2009-2011), the total 
burden of these subsidies on the government budget has ranged between USD 1 and 4.3 billion, or around 
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nomic value of environmental cobenefits in terms of 
avoided local pollution (for SO2, NOx, PM)
38 are esti-
mated at USD 2.3 million over the life of the plant, and 
increase to USD 7.2 million for the complete Ouarzazate 
portfolio and USD 28.8 million for Morocco’s Solar Plan 
as a whole.
Ouarzazate I’s impact on Morocco’s energy security 
is minimal due to its relatively small scale. In the long 
run, however, a larger portfolio of CSP in the country 
and development of a regional electricity market39 could 
improve Morocco’s energy security, reduce dependency 
on energy imports,40 diversify energy sources towards 
renewable energy, and create new generating capacity 
load which is currently met by fuel oil.
38 Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) valued at 5,220 USD/ton; Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) valued 
at: 5,165 USD/ton; (PM) valued at 20,823 USD/ton (ExternE).
39 Double 400-kV interconnections with Algeria and Spain already exist. 
The latter provides access to the Spanish and Portuguese markets and will 
provide access to the French market when the FR-ES interconnection is 
upgraded, which is expected to be completed in 2013.
40 Currently 97 percent of energy consumption (WB, 2011a).
to help meet high electricity demand growth.41 Indeed, 
the CTF’s impact indicators show that Ouarzazate I 
will reduce electricity imports only by a small amount 
(lifting renewable energy sources’ share of power gen-
erating capacity to 2 percent), but that more significant 
reductions would follow realisation of the complete 
Ouarzazate portfolio (to 8 percent) and the Morocco 
Solar Plan (42 percent). Noting that increasing world oil 
prices have caused Morocco’s trade deficit to balloon 
in recent years (by 21 percent in 2010-2011), decreas-
ing energy imports will enhance Morocco’s balance of 
trade and improve overall economic security. Improved 
energy security and import savings will, however, 
ultimately depend on the share of the CSP generated 
power that is kept for the local market and not exported 
into Europe.
41 An average 6 percent per year growth in domestic electricity demand neces-
sitates 700-800 MW per year in new generating capacity (WB, 2011a).
1-4.3 percent of the country’s GDP.1 Besides representing a heavy drain on public resources and incentivizing 
over-consumption of carbon-intensive energy, fuel subsidies also widen the competitiveness gap of renewable 
energies by lowering the average grid price by roughly 30 percent.2
The Government of Morocco is currently working to reform the existing subsidization system which is thought 
to favor wealthy citizens and failing to improve energy access for the poorest Moroccans.3 The government 
has announced that fuel subsidies will be replaced gradually by targeted cash grants for families in need. 
Indeed, IFI appraisals of Ouarzazate I economics already factor in the halving of current subsidies by 2020 
and a complete phase out by 2025. However, these changes have already sparked strikes and threats of social 
unrest (Achy, 2012), confirming that a direct reduction or complete removal of fossil-fuel subsidies remains a 
challenging political hurdle.
Increasing the deployment of renewable energy sources is a way to reduce demand for imported fossil fuels 
and, indirectly, the subsidies required to maintain them. However, at today’s technology costs, CSP power is 
still too expensive for Morocco and requires high levels of public support that outweighs those savings. In the 
case of Ouarzazate I, the plant requires an estimated USD 60 million of direct subsidies to achieve viability, 
but only displaces USD 12 million of fossil subsidies per year. 
Though certainly helpful, the removal of fossil-fuel subsidies alone would not be sufficient to make CSP power 
more competitive and sustainable. From this perspective, achieving the technology cost reductions targeted 
by the Morocco Solar Plan and by the CTF Investment Plan will be the cornerstone to making CSP power 
competitive.
1 WB, 2011a.
2 We have inferred an average level of subsidization of 30 percent from the overall value of fossil-fuel imports for 2010 (8.3 billion USD) and the 
cost of the fuel subsidies for the same year (2.5 billion USD).
3 In 2008, a study by Morocco’s High Commissioner for Planning concluded that 20 percent of wealthy households receive three-quarters of the 
government-allocated support for diesel and gasoline while 40 percent of needy families receive only 5 percent (Achy, 2012).
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MASEN
MASEN has multiple interests in the Ouarzazate I 
project and stands to receive multiple benefits.
As the project developer, MASEN will benefit from 
international concessional finance and the Government 
of Morocco subsidy. MASEN’s cash flow profile is 
determined by the guaranteed revenue stream from 
the Power Sale Agreements with ONE (estimated at 
between USD 30 and 35 million a year) and the fees it 
receives from the Solar Power Company (SPC) under 
the lease to use MASEN-owned site infrastructure, 
‘associated facilities’ (water, transmission lines, and 
road access), and the CSP infrastructure itself. On the 
negative side, MASEN is impacted by the costs of the 
PPA signed with the SPC (around USD 97-100 million 
a year) but this is compensated through a convention 
with the government to subsidize the costs of paying the 
Power Purchase Agreement with the SPC.
Other benefits may include profit on margins it gener-
ates through repackaging concessional debt, grants 
from IFIs, dividends as an equity holder of the project 
company, and sales of CO2 emission rights under 
the Clean Development Mechanism.42 The latter 
could amount to between USD 1.2 and 3 million per 
year (based on a USD5/t and USD13/t carbon price 
respectively).43
SPC equity providers
A consortium of private equity providers (including 
MASEN) stand to benefit from a guaranteed revenue 
stream through MASEN’s PPA. This will cover SPC 
costs after concessional finance is factored in, plus an 
acceptable margin that we estimate at 13.63 percent 
on a levered basis. There could also be a return from 
patents that are generated as a result of this project. 
The cash flow profile of the SPC equity holders is 
integrated in Figure 4 and highlights both revenues and 
costs.
The private consortium will also develop considerable 
experience from their involvement in Ouarzazate. This 
42 MASEN’s right to carbon finance revenues will be specified in the PPA 
between SPC and MASEN. The Ouarzazate Solar Plant Phase 1 was submit-
ted to the CDM registry on 28 September 2011 and is currently listed at the 
“Prior Consideration” stage.
43 We estimate a price range of USD 5 to 13/ton as the lowest reported cost for 
primary CERs by Gorina (2009) and the highest paid for “pioneering primary 
credits” according to ICIS (2011). The amount of CO2 emissions saved has 
been estimated by WB (2011a) but will have to be validated and approved 
by the CDM Executive Board.
will put them in a good position to invest in similar proj-
ects throughout the region.
Over time, some of the benefits will include those that 
stem from scalability. These include reduced technology 
costs, a ready workforce, and access to a wider electric-
ity market along with other regional developers.
IFI grantors and lenders
IFI grantors and lenders provide funding to the project 
on the basis of its contribution to the higher-level envi-
ronmental and development objectives. Lenders also 
aim to recoup the capital lent with a minimal return on 
the investment. (We estimate a blended concessional 
rate of 3.1 percent). As discussed, the standalone con-
tribution of Ouarzazate I is insufficient to meet higher-
level objectives. However, as the first stage of a new 
portfolio, it is almost inevitable that Ouarzazate I will 
bear some early-development costs (or “vintage costs”) 
to which future projects will not therefore be subject. 
IFIs will most likely remain involved in the subsequent 
phases of Ouarzazate and will continue to pursue those 
same objectives.
General public
The general public stands to benefit from local eco-
nomic development opportunities (jobs and training) 
that result from the project during construction and 
operation, improved energy security, and from the, 
eventual, technology-cost reductions that the Morocco 
Solar Plan will achieve. At the local level, the income 
(USD 3 million) from the sale of the land for the plant 
to ONE/MASEN is being used to fund the Ait Oukrour 
Toundout community’s local social development plan. 
MASEN and other public stakeholders will also contrib-
ute to this fund on a voluntary basis.
Has Ouarzazate I been effective?
The San Giorgio Group aims to facilitate an overall 
assessment of whether money is being spent effectively. 
To do this, we map out the policy steps and financial 
inputs that support implementation activities, through 
outputs and eventually, to final outcomes, in order to 
clearly identify the causal links between policies, invest-
ments, and final impacts (see Table 3).
Based on this analysis, we identify the main factors that 
determined the performance of the individual interven-
tion, and good practices which could be scaled up and 
replicated in other sectors, technologies, and geogra-
phies. We use a common set of appropriate criteria to 
systematically measure indicators such as total amount 
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INPUT OUTPUT INTERIM OUTCOME PROJECTED FINAL OUTCOME
•	 Private capital: 
USD 253 million
•	 Concessional 
public finance 
(grants, below-
market loans): 
USD 1 billion
•	 Market-like 
incentives 
(Government 
of Morocco 
subsidy): 
USD 1.19 billion
•	 Installed CSP 
capacity: 
160MW
•	 LCOE driven 
down by 25-30 
percent
•	 Local content 
valued at 30 
percent of plant 
capital costs
•	 Thousands 
full-time 
equivalent con-
struction jobs 
•	 Displaced fossil 
generation: 370 
GWh p.a.
•	 Solar Power 
Company IRR: 13.63 
percent (after tax)
•	 Government 
revenues (carbon 
market, taxes USD 
380 million, infra-
structure lease 
payments)
•	 Reduced imports or 
additional capacity 
to meet rising 
demand
•	 Hundreds of 
operations and 
maintenance jobs
•	 Avoided fossil-fuel subsidies: 
USD 64 million 
•	 CO2 avoided: 240 ktCO2 p.a.
•	 Lessons for replication and 
scale up of CSP in the MENA 
region and beyond
•	 Contribution to Moroccan 
Solar Plan eventual expected 
benefits: 
 » Local economic develop-
ment:1 USD 4.6 billion value 
added and 11,000 full-time 
equivalent jobs 
 » Shifting energy system away 
from fossil fuels
 » Improved energy security 
 » Technology cost reduction
 » Development of a regional 
electricity market / exports 
to EU: USD 3 billion export 
revenues
Table 3:  Summary of the effectiveness of the Ouarzazate intervention
1 Local manufacturing, R&D, industrial cluster development.
Note: All figures, unless specified, refer to the whole project life time. Government of Morocco subsidy of USD 1.19 billion is gross and does not account for subsidies 
saved on imported fuels and additional tax revenues. Total net cost to Moroccan budget estimated at USD 883 million (WB, 2011a). 
Source: data extracted from WB (2011a); AfDB (2012b)
invested and leveraged and the performance of financ-
ing practices in relation to green investment objec-
tives. As we build up a larger collection of case studies, 
we will compare results across different settings and 
attempt to draw lessons about what makes climate 
finance more or less effective.
In the context of Ouarzazate, we assess final outcomes 
against Ouarzazate’s expected 25 year life-cycle and 
associated projections.
We present the effectiveness framework as applied 
to Ouarzazate 1 in Table 3, which defines inputs as 
financial resources, outputs as direct results from the 
investment of those resources, interim outcomes as 
second order results derived from project outputs, and 
projected final outcomes as the cumulative benefits 
delivered over the lifetime of the project.
This map of interim and final outcomes highlights 
the expectation that Ouarzazate will yield significant 
environmental and economic benefits over its lifetime. 
The lessons generated will take Morocco and the region 
a step closer to the realization of a large-scale CSP 
portfolio.
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Risk allocation in Ouarzazate I
To understand how risks are allocated among stake-
holders, we have applied a three step risk management 
framework to the Ouarzazate I project. We:
1. identify and assess individual risks;
2. analyze the impacts and the mitigation instruments 
adopted to address critical risks; 
3. Depict the overall final risk allocation framework 
in Ouarzazate I, highlighting the instruments and 
arrangements used to shift risk between entities.
In the following chapter, we explore how the Ouarzazate 
I risk-sharing model reallocated risks between the 
private and public sectors. We also review the role of 
IFIs in relieving both sides of some financial risks.
 • The public-private partnership model shares project management risks between the public and 
the private stakeholders. In running the plant, stakeholders’ joint responsibilities help to align their 
interests.
 • A combination of PPA contracts shifts revenue risks from the private developer (the SPC) to MASEN 
and the Government of Morocco, which are backed by international aid. This helps to reduce the 
required rate of return from the private investor and makes the project viable.
 • Pre-emptive financing from international donors and multilateral banks greatly reduces the financial 
risks of the project while diversifying sources of capital.
Risk identification and assessment
We first categorized risks in the Ouarzazate project 
along three major dimensions:44
•	 Development risks refer to risks associated 
with the design and implementation phase of 
the project including procurement (equipment/
technology), construction, and financing risks;
•	 Operations risks include all risks associated 
with running the project, i.e. production and 
availability risks, operating costs (notably 
operations and maintenence risks), and 
revenues (power generation sale as affected by 
the power sales agreement and subsidy).
•	 Outcome risks refer to risks more specific 
to high-level public-policy objectives such as 
failure to meet environmental and local devel-
opment targets, risk of overpaying on subsidies, 
risk of not impacting technology costs or 
providing suitable demonstration effects to 
stimulate replication and scale up.
Next, we systematically classify the identified risks 
according to two criteria: their probability/frequency of 
occurrence (from very low to very high) and their grade 
of impact on the project’s financial and non-financial 
objectives (from very low to very high).
44 This approach builds upon the typical project risk breakdown along develop-
ment stages by adding the ‘outcome’ dimension, which is dedicated to the 
overarching results of the program. Acknowledging the degree of subjectiv-
ity embedded in this approach, and that some risks are interrelated and 
may involve more than one dimension, the San Giorgio Group strives to 
systematically capture these three dimensions across case studies.
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L O W - R I S K  E V E N T S
Risk events with low probability of occurrence and low to-medium impact: 
•	 Project development risk: The early-stage technology and the diverse interests of 
domestic and international actors make early termination a possible risk but with 
low impacts due to the disbursement of relatively little capital.
•	 Electricity Price Risk: This risk is borne by the Government of Morocco and inter-
national backers and is caused by low fossil-fuel prices driving wholesale prices 
below the benchmark set in the PPA between MASEN and ONE. This risk has low 
probability given the upward trend in international fuel prices (IEA, 2011).
M O D E R A T E - R I S K  E V E N T S
Risk events with moderate probability of occurrence, but medium-high impacts:
•	 Safeguards: The risk of non-fulfillment of social and environmental safeguards 
has high to medium impact as IFIs’ initial assessments of the project indicate the 
potential for substantial environmental and social impacts.
H I G H - R I S K  E V E N T S
Risk events with high to very high impact whatever the probability of occurrence:
•	 Equipment failure: Reduced production, increased costs, or delays could all 
negatively impact the financial performance of the project.45 Plant developers bear 
this risk.
•	 Reduced solar irradiation levels: Reduced solar irradiation levels on a given site 
would result in lower than projected production output. Similar to equipment 
failure, the developer bears this risk, however, the Government of Morocco 
indirectly bears this risk since it impacts the amount of fossil fuels displaced.
•	 Storage technology failure: Failure to effectively embed the thermal storage—the 
least proven component of CSP technology—would render the plant unable to 
supply peak-load power, currently provided by expensive imported oil. This in turn 
would seriously undermine both the economics of the project (a risk the developer 
bears) and the achievement of fossil-fuel subsidy savings (a risk the Government 
of Morocco bears).46
•	 Cost overruns and delays: The project is large and applies a relatively new business model—a public-pri-
vate partnership—for the country’s energy sector. This makes unforeseen delays and cost overruns highly 
possible. As a result of EPC contractual provisions, the developers bear this risk and its costs.
•	 PPA termination risk: Should the project developers fail to deliver the project on time, MASEN could 
terminate the PPA and exercise the put-option in the Shareholder Agreement.47 This is a low-probability 
event as MASEN is a shareholder of the SPC, however, it would have a disastrous impact on the project’s 
financial viability.
•	 Risk of insufficient funds to cover the viability gap: Should the Government of Morocco fail to continue 
paying a subsidy to MASEN, the agency would be forced to default on the PPA commitment. This would 
make the project unviable. 
•	 Risk of non-achievement of project objectives and higher-level objectives: The Government of Morocco 
bears this risk because Ouarzazate I is the first part of a portfolio approach that is complex, new, and in 
large part, contingent on the eventual export of energy to E.U. markets.
45 Norton Rose (2010) believes that solar thermal technology is now more on the proven than prototype side. Parabolic trough projects are already in place in 
numerous locations throughout the world and a 20 MW plant is already operational in Morocco. 
46 Refer to the “Investment, Return and Profitability” section.
47 By exercising the put-option in the Shareholder Agreement, MASEN can “walk away” from the SPC by selling its shares to the other partners at a pre-determined 
price (Norton Rose, 2010 – WB, 2011a).
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Risk analysis and mitigation instruments
Out of the high-risk events outlined above, we focus on 
the drivers and impacts of those that we deem the most 
important risks to the project fulfilling its objectives,48 
namely:
•	 Operating performance risk and specifically 
under-production as a result of equipment 
failure (during construction or operation) or 
lower than expected solar irradiation;
•	 cost overruns (CAPEX, OPEX, financing); and
•	 failure of the government to fully cover the 
viability gap.
The risk of non-achievement of project objectives 
and higher-level objectives is crucial from the point of 
view of public stakeholders and ultimately linked to the 
success of delivering the broader CSP portfolio to which 
Ouarzazate I belongs. A detailed analysis of this risk and 
of the available mitigation measures (“the five building 
blocks to replication”) is presented in Section 6.
1. Operating performance risk
Equipment failure and uncertainty of solar irradia-
tion levels represent risks for the ability of the plant to 
maintain expected energy generation levels. Equipment 
failure could result from operational stress of the 
generation processes and aging, corrosion, and fatigue 
of the materials. Irradiation levels can diverge from long-
term forecasts due to adverse weather events, such as 
sandstorms, and as a result of uncertainty in original 
site-specific irradiation measurements.
We estimate the risk of under-production as moder-
ately likely and quantify its impact by altering both 
the equipment’s degradation factor from the project’s 
initial projections, to account for equipment failure, and 
the forecasted level of production, to account for solar 
irradiance’s uncertainty49 (see Appendix B for more 
details). 
The following factors mitigate the impacts of 
48 Consistent with UNEP-SEFI (2008), we consider four typical risk responses: 
(1) risk avoidance, which eliminates the risk or protects the project from 
the risk by changing the project scope or adding resources to the project 
such as finances, time, and/or headcount, (2) risk transfer, which transfers 
the financial impact of the risk by contracting out part of the work to a most 
able party, (3) risk mitigation, which reduces the probability or impact of 
the risk to an acceptable level, and (4) risk acceptance, which addresses the 
risk should it occur.
49 Fitchtner Solar (2009)
operating performance risk on the Ouarzazate project 
considerably:
•	 Technology reliability: Parabolic trough 
technology is the most mature of currently 
available CSP technologies and has been 
successfully implemented in several projects 
across the world and in similar contexts (such 
as Andasol in Spain, which includes storage 
technology), albeit at much smaller scales;
•	 Expertise and advisors: To minimize the risk of 
picking the wrong technology for the wrong site, 
MASEN has employed an experienced technical 
advisor and will select a capable private 
consortium SPC partner. To mitigate construc-
tion and operation risks, the pre-qualification 
phase of the tender process required bidders to 
have successfully50 developed, operated, and 
managed large-scale thermal power plants and 
at least one solar power plant.
2. Cost overruns
The combination of new storage technology, the size of 
the power plant, and the relatively new public-private 
partnership financing approach make it moderately 
likely that project costs will go over estimates. To assess 
their impact, we increased both the estimated construc-
tion costs and the expected operations and mainte-
nance charges. As expected, given the high-capital 
intensity of the technology, construction cost overruns 
have the greatest impact on levelized costs of electricity 
and project returns as, we assume, the project would 
have to raise emergency funding at more expensive 
commercial rates51 (see Table 2 in Appendix B).
Specific procedures and contracts between project 
developers and service providers will transfer and, from 
the project company point of view, mitigate specific 
risks:
•	 MASEN has undertaken to select a reputable 
private consortium with a successful track-
record delivering a project of similar scale and 
technology.
•	 Engineering, Procurement and Construction 
(EPC) and Operations and Management 
(O&M) contractual specifications, to be defined 
50 Successfully was defined such that the applicant had not been liable for pen-
alties or liquidated damages in excess of 5 percent of contract value (Norton 
Rose, 2010).
51 Commercial lending rate estimated at 9 percent (Kulichenko and Wirth, 
2011). 
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during the bidding process, will 
determine the amount of cost 
overruns that will fall on the 
project developer and sponsors 
and those to be absorbed by the 
service providers;
We anticipate the public budget will be 
shielded from the risk of cost over-
runs by the expected provisions in the 
PPA and the Shareholder Agreement52 
(please see the following chapter on 
“The Ouarzazate I risk-sharing model”). 
Furthermore, the tender process will 
guarantee that the PPA price agreed 
on between MASEN and the SPC is 
based on a competitive projection of 
construction and operation costs (with 
the incentive for the bidders to quote 
a lower price, but one they can deliver). By design, the 
PPA price will not be impacted by subsequent cost 
increases.
3. Support shortfalls
The ability of the Government of Morocco to support 
MASEN’s long-term financial stability is outside the 
scope of this study. However, the net impact of the solar 
subsidy (which is key to the viability of the project) on 
the government budget is significant53 and depends on 
the value of the fossil-fuel subsidies displaced54 by the 
power that the CSP project generates. Figure 6 shows 
the amount of fossil-fuel subsidies that the Government 
of Morocco would have to pay in the absence of the 
Ouarzazate I project (green) and the additional solar 
subsidy (red) needed to meet the incremental cost 
of the CSP plant. As, historically, electricity tariffs for 
industrial usages have not shown much sensitivity to 
oil price fluctuations,55 we assume that fossil-fuel price 
variations would not be transferred directly onto the 
grid price but absorbed mostly through the level of 
subsidization. The figure then shows that a significant 
decrease in fossil-fuel prices would imply a greater 
52 We acknowledge that the contents of the final documents eventually signed 
by MASEN and the SPC may differ significantly from these expectations.
53 The solar subsidy represents approximately 0.22 percent of the total annual 
budget expenditures (source US Department of State, 2012).
54 Please see Box 1 in Section 3 for more details. Amounts of fossil fuel 
displaced (in the baseline scenario) have been estimated by ONE and valued 
at the following prices and quantities: Coal: 32,000 tons at 150 USD/ton; 
Natural Gas: 354,000 mbtu at 10 USD/mbtu; Fuel Oil: 67,000 tons at 450 
USD/ton.
55 Eurelectric Electricity Tariffs (2005-2007).
additional cost to the government budget compared to 
a scenario in which the same power is generated with 
conventional sources.
However, this risk is less probable given current expec-
tations that world oil prices will continue to grow.
Risk allocation framework
In Ouarzazate I, financial engineering and policies have 
been designed to alter the share of the project devel-
opment, operations, and outcome risks allocated to 
various parties. The dynamic risk allocation matrix in 
Figure 756 illustrates how risk is allocated to each major 
project stakeholder, on one hand, and how the overall 
risk profile shifts through the use of risk transfer instru-
ments, on the other. Risk is categorized according to the 
estimated ‘magnitude of risk’ multiplied by the ‘likeli-
hood of risk’:57 ‘very high’ in dark red, ‘high’ in orange, 
‘moderate’ in light orange and ‘low’ in yellow.
•	 As the following chapter will show in detail, in 
contrast to an independent power producer 
model (in which the private producer alone 
specifies the project’s design and implemen-
tation), the public-private partnership model 
shares the management of the project risks 
between the public (Government and MASEN) 
and the private stakeholders. 
•	 The amount of construction and operation 
risk that the plant developer will be able to 
offload to sub-contractors depends on the 
56 A more detailed risk allocation matrix is to be found in Annex A.
57 Given the lack of contract-level data available on this project, this weighting 
system is subjective.
Figure 6: Impact of fossil fuel price changes on Ouarzazate I incremental cost
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availability of counterparties willing to sign 
engineering, procurement, and construction 
(EPC) and operations and management (O&M) 
agreements.58
•	 The provision of IFIs’ concessional financing 
before the project is initiated (pre-emptive 
financing) reduces the project developer’s 
risk of capital shortages during construction 
(CAPEX risk). In turn, this significantly reduces 
the overall financial risk of the project including 
the cost of capital and required rate of return. At 
the same time, the explicit backing of multiple 
IFIs greatly improves investors’ confidence.
•	 As a shareholder in the public-private part-
nership model, MASEN shares the plant 
economics, mitigating the risk perceived by 
the developer of an unfavorable change of 
renewable energy policies in the country (policy 
risk).
•	 During the operation phase, MASEN and the 
project company sign a PPA which shifts both 
electricity price and quantity risk (revenue risk) 
from the project developer to the public sector. 
58 The availability of counterparties willing to bear full construction and 
operation risks is often linked with the maturity of the technology and the 
development of the industrial sector—hence it is usually lower for newer 
technologies. 
The PSA between MASEN and ONE guarantees 
the full dispatch to the grid of the electricity 
bought from the project; while the convention 
between the Government of Morocco and 
MASEN (“SICS”) provides the agency with 
funds to meet the gap between the two power 
prices. Should any public budget difficulties 
arise (shortfall risk), a loan facility from the 
IBRD supports the Government of Morocco. 
•	 The presence and backing of international 
donors partially relieves local authorities of 
the project implementation burden, mitigating 
the risk of the project failing to meet higher-
level objectives (outcome risk).59 However, the 
conditions placed on the loans and the IFI’s right 
to object to all significant decisions increase 
MASEN’s (and the Government of Morocco’s) 
risk in managing the project. The following 
chapter provides more in-depth analysis of 
the public-private partnership model and the 
role of IFIs in Ouarzazate I, drawing lessons 
about how the project is being structured and 
implemented.
59 The involvement of European donors and the European Commission may 
also help to mitigate the risk that subsequent phases of the Ouarzazate 
project would fail to access the European electricity market through power 
export arrangements.
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The Ouarzazate I risk-sharing 
model
This section analyzes in detail the business model 
deployed in Ouarzazate I:
•	 the public-private partnership model, its 
principles of risk allocation and expected 
impacts on the project’s probability of success; 
and
•	 the role and mode of engagement of inter-
national donors, their coordination and risk 
sharing arrangements.
The public-private partnership model
The commercial immaturity and the very high capital 
costs of CSP in Morocco mean that high levels of 
national and international support are necessary for the 
project to proceed. However, for future phases of the 
project, the high levels of concessional support present 
in Ouarzazate will not be sustainable. For this reason, 
the Government of Morocco designed a public-private 
partnership that, through a tendering process, taps 
financial resources, managerial capacity, and pursuit of 
technological innovation from the private sector, while 
retaining control over the quality and the quantity of the 
output (Burger, 2008; Teichmann, 2011).
Typical public-private partnership structures60 align the 
objectives of public and private partners by transfer-
ring operational delivery risk to the private partners. 
60 There is a lack of consensus around the structure of a “typical” public-
private partnership and its definition. In this work we refer to the definition 
advanced by the OECD: “A public-private partnership is defined as an agree-
ment between the government and one or more private partners (which 
may include the operators and the financiers) according to which the private 
partners deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery 
objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the 
private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a 
sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners” (OECD, 2008).
These structures aim to balance the amount of both 
exogenous and endogenous risks61 the public agent 
(MASEN in this case) transfers to the private actor, with 
the higher-risk premiums required by the latter. The 
optimal risk allocation rests on the proper identification 
of the nature of the risks and of the stakeholders best 
suited to bear them at the lowest costs. In most cases, 
endogenous risks (those directly related to the project, 
such as construction and performance risks) are best 
allocated to the private partner, giving them the incen-
tive to execute the project as efficiently as possible; 
while exogenous risks (those external to the project, 
such as policy and regulation risks) are more effectively 
allocated to the public partner (Teichmann, 2011).
Interestingly, in Ouarzazate I, the public partner is 
on both the supply and demand side of the public-
private partnership: MASEN is both the purchaser of the 
service and a shareholder of the company operating the 
plant. This feature theoretically shifts the risk burden 
more towards the public entity than it would with other 
concessions/privatizations. This in turn should incen-
tivize bidders to lower their required rate of return 
(OECD, 2008).62 At the same time, it also allows 
MASEN greater control and active participation on 
the production side of the service. The joint respon-
sibility for running the plant improves the alignment of 
stakeholders’ interests and mitigates the risk that the 
private project developer might inflate costs and/or 
operate the plant inefficiently once revenues have been 
granted.
61 Endogenous risks are the ones in which the project developer/sponsor has 
control to a certain extent and can directly manage in order to influence the 
actual outcome (e.g. technology, management of financial resources, coun-
terparty). Exogenous risks are those onto which the project developer has 
neither control, nor ability to mitigate (e.g. political risks, adverse changes in 
national policies, currency devaluation). (OECD, 2008).
62 However, the perceived risk of dealing with the public entity as shareholder 
could offset this risk reduction. Given the early stage of the tendering 
process, this instance has not been verified.
 • The public-private partnership model with competitive tendering and the two Power Price Agreements 
(PPAs) efficiently allocate policy risks to the public sector and project-related performance risks to 
the private sector. Early results from the bidding process show project costs in line with, if not below, 
projections.
 • The process of coordinating concessional financing from lenders has been time consuming and resource 
intensive but has lowered transaction costs, boosted investor confidence and improved the project’s 
economics.
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In Ouarzazate I, the majority of risks are allocated 
between parties via two contracts:
•	 the Shareholder Agreement between MASEN 
and the private consortium (yet to be selected);
•	 the PPA between MASEN and the SPC.63
The Shareholder Agreement defines the allocation 
of shares, profits, and voting rights under the public-
private partnership. It regulates the representation of 
minority shareholders on the Board and establishes 
quorum rules for management decisions. Finally, it 
defines  liabilities and allocates the company’s man-
agement risks between parties. In particular, to shield 
MASEN from construction risks, the agreement grants 
the agency a put-option, that is, the right to sell back 
its shares to the Consortium at a pre-defined price in 
the event that MASEN decides to terminate the PPA as 
a consequence of the private partner defaulting on its 
obligations (WB, 2011a).
The PPA obliges MASEN to purchase all of the power 
generated by the plant during its expected 25 years of 
operation at a pre-determined price set through the 
competitive tender. This guarantees the required rate 
of return requested by the private investor during the 
tender and shields the private partner from exogenous 
risks affecting the value of the electricity generated. 
These exogenous risks include oil-price spikes, govern-
ment policy on fossil-fuel subsidies that would affect 
the electricity price on the national grid, and changes of 
the government policy towards renewable energy.
The PPA also requires the consortium to pay financial 
lump-sum penalties to MASEN in case of construc-
tion delays or failure to deliver the contracted capacity. 
It grants MASEN the right to terminate its purchas-
ing commitment if the plant’s performance and/or its 
consortium management fail to meet pre-determined 
requirements (WB, 2011a). In contrast to other exam-
ples of PPAs in the region, this PPA grants the emission 
credit rights that may eventually be assigned to the 
plant under the Clean Development mechanism to the 
power off-taker MASEN (Norton Rose, 2010).
At this stage of the project, the public-private partner-
ship design seems to follow the principles of optimal 
risk sharing, allocating endogenous risks to the private 
partner and exogenous ones to the public agency. 
However, it is too early to draw conclusions on whether 
this has meaningfully reduced the private sector’s 
63 The exact terms of these documents are still confidential and most likely 
subject to changes before the tender and/or contract process is complete.
perceived risk and required return. More evidence 
is needed to establish if the lower-than-anticipated 
private-sector bids can be attributed to the public-pri-
vate partnership design or if they are caused by lower-
than-expected project cost. Early bids under the tender 
process suggest that levelized costs (LCOE) per unit of 
power are projected in line with, if not below, the LCOE 
estimated at the beginning of the project.64 If the lower 
bid of USD189.7/MWh prevails, it would imply a lower 
unit cost of approximately USD 4700/kW (20 percent 
reduction over the projected figure) for the plant. 
Importantly, this would reduce the amount of incremen-
tal public subsidy required to compensate for the price 
difference between the PPA and PSA, from USD 60 
million to USD 40 million per year.65
International financial institution 
engagement and coordination
Concessional financing drives down the levelized cost 
of energy generated by Ouarzazate I by around 30 
percent66 by reducing the cost of capital and the uncer-
tainty about its availability. The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development’s (IBRD) provision of 
a facility to partially guarantee the government subsidy 
also adds to investors’ comfort, visibility of long-term 
revenues, and the credit worthiness of the PPA coun-
terparty. Furthermore, the donors and multilateral 
development banks bring their project design, imple-
mentation experience, and political clout, reducing the 
likelihood of project failure. 
In this section, we focus on the specific arrangements 
and coordination efforts that have facilitated the 
engagement of several donors and banks, helping to 
achieve affordable finance at scale in a relatively short 
time-period.
Concessional financiers in Ouarzazate I are organized 
around three lead-financiers: the AfDB, the WB, and 
the EIB (representing European donors), with the WB 
and AfDB channeling CTF funds. MASEN is the sole 
borrower of the concessional loans as well as the sole 
direct beneficiary. MASEN negotiated directly with IFIs 
and functions as a lender of funds to the SPC through 
a unified package that blends together the terms of the 
different loans. Interestingly, financing has not been 
pooled or syndicated67 as is typical with the involve-
64 See note 25 in Section 3.
65 See Section 3 for details on the estimation of the PSA and PPA reference 
prices.
66 See Section 3 for more details.
67 “A syndicated loan is one that is provided by a group of lenders and is 
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ment of commercial banks. Instead, each IFI agreed to 
its own terms and conditions for the loan with MASEN 
and, more importantly, will sign a “no-objection” letter 
to approve all major decisions in the project. MASEN’s 
efforts to coordinate and harmonize donors’ require-
ments and procedures was crucial to move the process 
forward quickly. However, the process remains cumber-
some and further improvements are needed to stream-
line financing arrangements and minimize transaction 
costs.
One key risk that requires management going forward 
is the likely coexistence of different interest charges, 
loan tenders and collateral guarantees across the loan 
portfolio. European donors (EIB, KfW and AFD) avoided 
this complication by choosing not to syndicate their 
contributions, but rather to contribute through a joint 
financing package with synchronized loans. The EIB 
coordinated two umbrella agreements laying down the 
provisions for donors’ coordination:
•	 The Pari-Passu Implementation Agreement 
ensures that the disbursement of funds towards 
the project is conducted in a ‘fair way’ (pari-
passu) across financers, that is, simultaneously 
on a pro-rata basis.
structured, arranged, and administered by one or several commercial or 
investment banks known as arrangers” – source: Standard & Poor’s (2010).
•	 The Cross-Collateralization Agreement 
stipulates that the same asset acts as collateral 
for all the loans included in the agreement.
To minimize the compliance burden on the borrower, all 
lenders developed a common set of procedures (cover-
ing procurement rules and social and environmental 
standards), and agreed to adopt the World Bank’s 
procurement rules and standards for all the loans. This 
process has been relatively time and resource intensive 
but should allow a smooth ongoing operation of the 
financing arrangement and timely monitoring of the 
investment.
Importantly, early coordination and agreement with 
donors has allowed MASEN to provide clear guide-
lines on the terms and costs at which capital would 
be offered to private investors who are bidding for the 
project. This transparency appears to have incentivized 
competition among investors, resulting in required rate 
of returns in line with other, less risky renewable energy 
projects in the country (Attijari, 2010), and in bids in 
line with or below the projected levels.
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Is Ouarzazate I replicable and 
scalable?
Ouarzazate’s stakeholders understand that it is 
one of the first in a series of CSP installations that 
should lead to a large-scale portfolio of CSP plants in 
Morocco and the MENA region. Indeed, Ouarzazate I 
only makes economic sense in the context of a portfolio 
of CSP projects which, through technology cost reduc-
tions and the development of an integrated, regional 
CSP market, delivers significant net economic benefits.
Herein lies a ‘chicken or the egg’ dilemma: In order 
to scale up a CSP portfolio, given limited public 
resources, projects must become increasingly com-
mercially viable. Costs must come down through 
economies of scale and revenues must be enhanced 
through exports to Europe. But achieving commercial 
viability requires experience, capacity, and associated 
infrastructures (such as transmission lines and intercon-
nectors). Because commercial viability and the develop-
ment of a portfolio of projects are interdependent, there 
is no ‘low-cost’ first step.
Therefore, the first publicly-supported large scale CSP 
projects play a crucial role bridging the development of 
a more commercially-sustainable, regional CSP market. 
These first projects should reduce uncertainties about 
costs and risks for investors, including commercial 
banks. They will do this by demonstrating that the tech-
nology can deliver, that the project can be realized on 
time and within a budget, and that contractual arrange-
ments allow for reliable revenue streams.
The Clean Technology Fund CSP Investment Plan alone 
contains USD 550 million of concessional finance 
for CSP projects in the MENA region over and above 
Ouarzazate I. IFIs that will channel this finance have 
expressed willingness to co-fund these projects with 
their own resources (CTF, 2012).
We now explore which elements have worked well so 
far in Ouarzazate I, and consider whether replicating 
elements would be sufficient to support the next round 
of large-scale CSP projects in the region.
What is working in Ouarzazate I?
The Ouarzazate I project is in the late stages of design 
specification. It is therefore premature to assess 
whether its implementation has been successful. 
However, early indicators—such as significant support 
from international development banks and interest from 
private-sector bidders—suggest that the project has 
potential to progress towards the final stages of devel-
opment and, subsequently, operation.
As other similar large-scale CSP projects begin to get 
off the ground in the region, it is valuable to draw out 
lessons from Ouarzazate I that could be replicated by 
future projects. In doing so, we recognize the signifi-
cant diversity among countries in the MENA region 
and acknowledge that new challenges could arise in 
each case. These could include variations in electricity 
market structures, as well as economic, political, and 
policy contexts that differ from those in Ouarzazate I.
This aside, we identify five decisive building blocks 
in the Ouarzazate I project which could potentially 
 • Five key building blocks underpin Ouarzazate’s progress to date. These include: (1) strong public support 
and the close alignment of key public partners, (2) financial and technical support from international 
financial institutions, (3) strong donor engagement and coordination, (4) a carefully designed business 
model and tendering procedure, and (5) a project design that is built on past lessons learned. These 
building blocks could be replicated by other large scale CSP projects in the region, given the right 
economic, political, and policy contexts. 
 • Given the finite nature of public resources, more commercially-oriented financing models will need to 
emerge. These financing models will most likely be supported by lower technology costs, lower project 
costs, and higher market revenues (e.g. E.U. export revenues). 
 • By 2020, technology costs are expected to come down but not to the level that is required to reach grid 
parity in domestic MENA markets (even accounting for phase out of fossil-fuel subsidies). 
 • It’s feasible that renewable power exports to European markets could fill the remaining viability gap in 
the medium- to long-term. However, considerable political support will be crucial to secure EU Member 
States’ demand and to broker specific agreements that make this a reality.
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be replicated in other large-scale CSP projects in the 
region.
1. Strong public support and close alignment of key 
public partners 
The Government of Morocco and MASEN have 
played a crucial role in designing and implementing an 
appropriate framework to support Ouarzazate I. The 
Government of Morocco established a favorable regula-
tory framework for private-sector engagement in the 
electricity market and a strong renewable policy frame-
work. In particular, the government has set clear and 
ambitious development targets for renewable energy 
sources (both wind and solar);68 it has established a 
specialized professional entity tasked with realizing 
CSP projects (MASEN) and is financially supporting 
MASEN’s work to implement the Moroccan Solar Plan. 
The further opening of Morocco’s electricity system 
to the private sector will itself help to attract financ-
ing, expertise, management skills, and entrepreneurial 
efficiency.69
Legal agreements ensure alignment between key 
government players. The agreement between the 
Government and MASEN provides certainty that the 
viability gap will be covered while a second agreement 
between MASEN and ONE guarantees connection to 
the grid and full dispatch of electricity.
MASEN has led the Ouarzazate project to date and 
plays a critical role within the public-private partnership 
structure. It sought expert advice to develop a project 
design that promotes efficient risk sharing between 
public and private partners. Importantly, it successfully 
secured substantial amounts of concessional finance 
from a range of international donors, whose early com-
mitments attracted potential private-sector partners.
2. Significant financial and technical contributions 
from IFIs 
IFIs have provided both financial and specialized, 
technical support to the project. A high level of early 
and sustained IFIs engagement has fostered the proj-
ect’s credibility and helped to mitigate risks perceived 
by private-sector investors. For example, the African 
Development Bank and the World Bank worked 
closely with MASEN on project design and all donors 
68 Namely the 1000 MW Wind Integrated Energy Plan, the 2000 MW Mo-
rocco Solar Plan, and the 13-09 Renewable Energy Law.
69  Here we echo recent work of the OECD in indentifying, beyond financial 
support and policies, clear national goals, competitive and transparent pro-
cesses, and private sector engagement as critical elements of a regulatory 
framework that supports climate-resilient investments (OECD, 2012). 
committed significant resources to make the project 
work, in some cases making compromises on loan 
requirements to reduce the burden for MASEN. This 
commitment to the project’s success could be repli-
cated in future interventions.
3.  Strong engagement and coordination of donors 
Considerable effort and strong coordination between 
IFIs and Moroccan stakeholders has been essential to 
get such a large and complex project off the ground. 
Donor coordination to harmonize conditions, safe-
guards, procurement, and no-objection and reporting 
rules was time consuming and challenging. However, it 
established a valuable model for subsequent projects. In 
the future, the syndication of loans, for example, could 
help reduce the project developers’ burden to deal with 
multiple lenders and their separate loan rates, condi-
tions, and procedures.
As subsequent projects are designed, including 
Ouarzazate Phase II, it will be important to promote the 
participation of commercial banks and capital markets, 
thereby increasing the leverage ratio of concessional 
finance. While this will be essential in order to increase 
the amount of capital for the technology, it will also 
introduce new challenges for coordination and risk 
sharing between parties. As Ouarzazate I has demon-
strated, there may be significant benefits in dealing with 
these issues preemptively and transparently.
The eventual phase out of IFI support will be both 
unavoidable, given finite resources, and necessary, 
to avoid crowding-out the private finance that is core 
to realizing the scale of investments required (OECD, 
2012).
4. A carefully designed public-private partnership and 
competitive tendering procedure to attract the right 
expertise and efficiently allocate risk 
The public-private partnership model allows the optimal 
alignment of risk between public and private players, 
according to their expertise. For example, the private 
developer takes on construction and operational risk 
while the government takes on electricity market risk 
(revenue risk). MASEN’s role in the public-private part-
nership is innovative: It acts as both equity investor and 
purchaser of the power (off-taker) and it has the ability 
to align public and private objectives. Ouarzazate’s 
development and operation will show whether this 
alignment will be realized. Through MASEN’s role as 
an equity shareholder and a conduit for concessional 
finance, the Government of Morocco shows it has skin 
in the game. This allows the government to exercise 
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greater control over the project and share in the proj-
ects’ successes or failures.
In addition, MASEN has led a transparent and well-
managed two-stage competitive tendering process  
that has attracted considerable private-sector interest. 
The invitation to tender expressed clear guidelines for 
the terms and modalities of public sector support.  The 
SPC’s ability to access sufficient concessional financ-
ing provided potential bidders with more certainty over 
financing costs and lowered their required rates of 
return. 
Early indications suggest that MASEN is functioning 
well as a professional agency and is actively forging a 
conducive investment model in which it participates 
actively. The experience points to the benefits of 
setting up a new, specialized government agency to 
drive forward implementation of ambitious renewables 
objectives.
5. A project design built on past lessons learned
Prior to the Ouarzazate I project, the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) provided support to a 
program that developed several CSP projects in Mexico, 
Morocco, and Egypt (see Annex C). All of these 
encountered numerous challenges and delays, including 
untested technology, a lack of opportunities to build up 
economies of scale, and unsuitable business models, 
which contributed to project failures.
The Ouarzazate I project benefited from exchanges with 
other large-scale CSP projects that are in development 
in India and South Africa, as well as experience gained 
from the above-mentioned GEF project (WB, 2011a). As 
such, Ouarzazate I was designed at a scale large enough 
to contribute significantly to building a portfolio that will 
drive technology-cost reductions. Partners selected a 
business model, the public-private partnership, which 
provides explicit measures to align the objectives and 
expectations of host governments (creating local oppor-
tunities), donors (building the experience of the public 
and private sectors which can be applied to future 
projects) and the private sector (providing investment 
security and opportunity). Finally, numerous studies 
were carried out to choose an appropriate technological 
mix.
Sharing lessons from the design and implementation of 
CSP projects will help reduce project costs and increase 
efficiencies that will help Morocco and the MENA 
region develop a CSP portfolio. The Government of 
Morocco is actively engaged in a number of knowledge 
platforms e.g. through the Climate Investment Fund, 
the Mediterranean Solar Plan, Medgrid, the Desertec 
Industry Initiative, etc.
Scaling up the CSP portfolio 
Replicating the Ouarzazate I financing model will not 
be sufficient in and of itself to support the develop-
ment of a large-scale portfolio of CSP projects. To reach 
the scale desired by the Moroccan and Mediterranean 
Plans, significant sums of additional capital will be 
needed. Given the scarcity of public and international 
support, more commercially-oriented financing models 
will need to emerge. These commercially-oriented 
financing models will most likely require:
1. Reduced technology/project costs, and
2. Higher market revenues (e.g. E.U. export revenues).
In addition, to support and stimulate the development 
of an active CSP market, predictable and stable poli-
cies will be required to generate positive incentives for 
private investors.  For example, Morocco has renewable 
energy and solar targets in place but supports proj-
ects on a project-by-project basis instead of applying 
standardized policy support measures across sectors 
or directed toward particular technologies (e.g. feed-
in-tariffs / premia, tax incentives, tradable certificates 
or renewable portfolio standards, carbon taxation or 
trading). Such a piece-meal approach could limit the 
potential for scale-up and replicability and ultimately 
slows the speed of development of CSP in the region. 
The presence of conflicting policies that support fossil-
fuel consumption also make it difficult for renewable 
technologies to compete, drain financial resources away 
from low-carbon investments, and weaken the percep-
tion of the country’s commitment on its climate tar-
gets.70 On a positive note, the Government of Morocco’s 
desire to embrace private energy producers,71 the trans-
parency of the Ouarzazate I competitive tender, and the 
commitment of public resources (through MASEN) to 
improve the project’s viability provide important incen-
tives that should attract private investors to the country 
and lower the perception of regulatory and policy risk.72
70 Other investment barriers reported for Morocco include: inadequate institu-
tional structures, insufficient coherence and cooperation between Ministries, 
insufficient strategic guidance, insufficient information made available to 
investors, a lack of experience in the administration, and a lack of financial 
incentives (EU, 2010).
71 ONE can issue competitive tenders for IPPs to supply capacity greater than 
10MW and auto-producers can sell power surplus to ONE up to 50MW with 
tariffs including a 20 percent uplift compared to ONE’s normal tariffs.
72 As a comparison, despite similar policy targets, Tunisia is struggling to at-
tract the same interest from international private investors because there is 
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We now briefly consider progress toward reducing tech-
nology costs and realising renewable exports.
1. A critical mass of publicly supported CSP projects 
will help to drive faster reductions in technology 
costs; combined with the removal of fossil-fuel 
subsidies, this will help move CSP towards grid 
parity.
Capital costs of CSP plants remain very high. Initial 
estimates of capital investment costs for Ouarzazate 
I stood at USD 6000/kW73—or about three times 
the initial investment costs for an average coal power 
plant.74 
Costs are gradually coming down and have the potential 
to come down much further. Hinkley et al. (2011) esti-
mate that CSP costs have decreased by 15 percent with 
each doubling of cumulative deployment over the past 
twenty years. Meanwhile, Kulichenko and Wirth (2011) 
estimate that CSP levelized costs have the potential to 
fall from USD 0.21 – 0.26 /kWh in 2010 to USD 0.17 
– 0.18 /kWh (19 percent) by 2020.75 Figures avail-
a perception of lower commitment from the government and a higher level 
of political and regulatory instability.
73 Not yet publicly disclosed bids indicate lower capital costs. See Section 3 
and note 25 for more details.
74 Hypothetical coal plant investment costs reported in the Tanger Wind Park 
CDM PDD are approximately USD 1,800/KW (ONE, 2007).
75 The lower end estimates are based on projections of cost reduction 
potentials for parabolic trough components while the higher end estimates 
consider a range of CSP technologies and the effect of performance data. 
able in initial proposal documentation for Ouarzazate I 
indicated LCOE of approximately USD 0.25/kWh while 
bids reportedly range from USD 0.19/kWh - USD 0.25/
kWh (see footnote 28 in Section 3). These initial projec-
tions and the high end bid suggest that CSP costs might 
remain high, in line with 2010 estimates presented 
above. Further examination of the USD 0.19/kWh bid 
may shed light on whether technology cost reductions 
were a significant factor in driving down this consor-
tium’s price.
Nonetheless, even the lowest Ouarzazate I bid is still 
far from grid parity. Achieving parity would in fact 
require an LCOE of around USD 0.08 /kWh—a further 
cost reduction of 11 cents per kWh. We estimate that 
removal of fossil-fuel subsidies would increase grid 
prices to approximately USD 0.11 /kWh, which would 
necessitate less steep reductions of 8 cents per kWh.76
The current increase in the scale and number of CSP 
projects should help to facilitate faster technology cost 
reductions by building economies of scale in manufac-
turing, learning curve effects, and technical innovation. 
A critical mass of publicly supported large-scale early 
projects could help to drive cost reductions at a faster 
rate than has been witnessed to date, in turn paving 
the way for more commercial players to come into the 
market and complete the regional CSP portfolio.
The estimates were produced by modeling reference plants (location not 
specified) and do not include costs related to transmission connection, land 
or water. 
76 Please see Box 1 for a more detailed treatment of the impact of fossil-fuel 
subsidies on the project.
Box 2 Preconditions for the export of renewable power to E.U. markets
 • Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements: The E.U. Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC) (EU, 2009), Article 
9, provides the legal basis for E.U. Member States to meet part of their renewable energy targets for 
2020 by importing renewable power from neighboring countries. However, the electricity needs to 
be imported physically and to be consumed in an E.U. Member State.1 Trade conditions have to be 
established in the form of bilateral or multilateral agreements. Morocco has already signed cooperation 
agreements with France and Germany and expects to sign further agreements with Spain and Italy in the 
near future.2
1 There is a limited possibility to rely on statistical transfers (i.e. the electricity is consumed domestically, but is counted toward the renewable 
energy share of a supporting E.U. Member State for compliance purposes under the Renewable Energy Directive) if an interconnector is under 
construction before 2016 to enable physical imports into the E.U.
2 In May 2011, the Desertec Industrial Initiative and MASEN also signed a Memorandum of Understanding to develop a 500MW solar Reference 
Project to demonstrate the feasibility of exporting solar power from Morocco to Spain, with exports expected to commence between 2014 and 
2016. Source: http://www.dii-eumena.com/country-focus/morocco.html
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2. Exports to E.U. markets could make CSP production 
in the MENA region viable.
One objective of the Moroccan and Mediterranean 
solar plans is to sell electricity to the European 
Union markets, given that current MENA domestic 
grid prices are significantly lower than current CSP 
generation costs. Higher power prices and existing 
support schemes for renewable power available in 
some European countries could already be sufficient 
to exceed the costs of CSP generation in the MENA 
region, thus opening the potential to achieve mutual 
economic benefits. MASEN’s financial model simulated 
the expected revenues from power sales to E.U. export 
markets at a 30 percent premium above generation 
costs. 
Based on the Ouarzazate I financial model and the list of 
plants to be developed under the Moroccan Solar Plan, 
MASEN could reach financial equilibrium thanks to 
increasing exports, from zero percent in 2015 to seven 
percent in 2016 and 46 percent from 2019 onward 
(WB, 2011a). However, there are several preconditions 
that need to be resolved before exports to E.U. markets 
from the MENA region can be realised (see Box 2). 
 • Removal of Subsidies: The E.U. Renewables Directive outlaws domestic operational support (such 
as a FiT) for electricity that is exported, to avoid double subsidization.3 However, upfront support 
(concessional finance, investment grants, etc.) is permitted. The presence of a heavily subsidized PPA 
rules out the ability to export power generated by Ouarzazate I. Furthermore, it implies that to achieve 
export potential, electricity generated in following phases of the project will not be able to rely on 
operational support secured by the Government of Morocco.
 • Physical Investments: Interconnector capacity needs to be available to export renewable power to 
Europe. Spare capacity seems to be available on the existing 700MW interconnection between Morocco 
and Spain,4 which, for the time being would primarily allow access to Spanish and Portuguese markets,5 
although an additional interconnection to Spain is planned. An interconnection exists between Algeria 
and Morocco with a maximum transmission capacity of 700 MW each way, which could provide 
alternative routes to Europe in the future as part of an integrated E.U.-MENA market. In order to attract 
project developers, Office National De L’Electricité (ONE) and the Government of Morocco will need to 
provide clear signals regarding export revenue potential.
 • Demand from E.U. Member States: The final major precondition for exports to E.U. Member States is the 
willingness of the states themselves to purchase renewable power from the MENA region. The European 
Commission’s assessment of Member State National Renewable Action Plans (NREAP) indicated that 
the 27 E.U. Member States expected to exceed the 2020 20 percent renewable energy target in the 
“additional energy efficiency scenario” (20.6 percent) and only slightly miss it in the reference scenario 
(19 percent) (EC, 2012). This suggests there may not be much demand from E.U. countries. There are 
two exceptions: Luxembourg and Italy. Italy, according to its NREAP, requires a substantial amount 
of renewable electricity to fulfil its target under the Renewable Energy Directive and is seeking cost-
effective means to achieve its obligations. At the same time, some Member States, such as Germany, 
have policy objectives that go beyond those of the E.U. renewable directive, and promote adoption of a 
post-2020 view that acknowledges the need for imports.6 
3 In order to avoid the possibility that costs could be subsidized through E.U. concessional loans or domestic public finance, and then again through 
subsidized power purchase prices.
4 http://tdworld.com/underground_transmission_distribution/power_bridge_two_continents/ 
5 As the interconnector to France is currently congested until the planned upgrade in 2013, further physical export to France and beyond is not pos-
sible. Additional electricity from North Africa would have to be consumed in the Iberian Peninsula.
6 For example, Germany’s energy concept foresees imports from North Africa by 2050 to meet its ambitious targets for GHG reduction of 80 per-
cent by 2050 (on 1990 levels) and for the amount of renewable energy as a proportion of gross final energy consumption of 18 percent by 2020, 
30 percent by 2030, 45 percent by 2040, and 60 percent by 2050.
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Of note, the possibility to export power from Morocco’s 
CSP plants into European markets presents a trade-off 
between financial viability on one hand, and domestic 
energy and environmental effects on the other. On one 
hand, ‘diverting’ power away from the Moroccan market 
through sales to Europe would significantly lighten the 
pressure on the national budget of covering the cost 
of subsidies. On the other hand, diverting renewable 
power away from the domestic market reduces the 
potential to displace fossil-fuel electricity (and hence 
reduces the savings that could be achieved through 
decreased imports and subsidies). Diverting power 
to E.U. markets also limits Morocco’s opportunity to 
improve domestic energy security.
In summary, exports of renewable power to European 
markets are a feasible means of filling the financial 
viability gap, in the medium- to long-term. However, 
considerable political support will be crucial to secure 
demand from E.U. Member States and to broker specific 
agreements that will make exports a reality.
Scaling up a CSP portfolio in the MENA region and else-
where in the world will be challenging, given the high 
costs of developing early projects and the necessary 
infrastructure to support them. The Ouarzazate case 
indicates that financing specific projects is possible with 
the close alignment of public, international, and private 
stakeholders, and careful design and coordination. Such 
an achievement, however, may not be enough to scale 
up a national or regional portfolio. This greater goal may 
be met only if projects are commercially viable, through 
a reduction in costs and access to higher market rev-
enues, both of which will require considerable political 
support from national and international players.
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Conclusions
CSP technology has enormous unexploited potential, 
particularly in the MENA region, but is still not commer-
cially viable. This is particularly evident in markets, such 
as those in MENA, where energy prices are distorted by 
heavy fossil-fuel subsidies. It is still too early to know if 
Ouarzazate I will be large enough to prove the com-
mercial maturity of its storage component technol-
ogy and to meaningfully drive the technology costs 
down. However, meeting early milestones will be crucial 
to maintain financial backing from both the Moroccan 
Government and international lenders, whose early 
support is essential to deliver the whole portfolio of 
projects contained in the Moroccan Solar Plan and the 
MENA CSP Investment Plan.  
The early signs are encouraging. In the case of 
Ouarzazate, public resources have played a decisive 
role in getting the project up and running. Significant 
up-front international concessional finance has 
covered early-development costs and will help the 
technology develop until its level of profitability is suf-
ficient to attract unsubsidized private capital. At the 
same time, international lenders need to improve the 
coordination and harmonization of lending packages 
to avoid excessive transaction costs, lengthy proce-
dures, and unbearable compliance requirements.
The Moroccan Government has provided generous 
domestic backing for the project, covering the signifi-
cant price differential between power bought from 
generators and sold onto the grid. This has made the 
project viable for public and private entities. Together 
with the support to renewable energies, the government 
is also committed to phase out fossil-fuel subsidies and 
is currently reducing its compensation system. While 
this alone would be insufficient to make CSP power 
commercially viable, it is a necessary step towards the 
development of a policy framework that truly supports 
low-carbon investments.
MASEN’s innovative design for the governing public-
private partnership seems to have effectively allo-
cated risk between private and public stakeholders.77 
Giving early notice of financing terms and costs allowed 
prospective investors to factor savings into their bids, 
attracted their interest early, and resulted in levelized 
cost estimates in line with, and for some bids lower, 
than what was projected. The public-private partner-
ship allocated risks to the stakeholders who were best 
equipped to manage those risks. Construction and oper-
ating risks were assigned to private developers while 
political and policy risks rested within the public sphere.
In the future, CSP power will remain expensive in the 
Moroccan market even with fossil-fuel subsidy phase 
outs and technology costs reductions. Public support 
alone will not assure the financial viability of the 
Ouarzazate project (including phases II and III). 
Favorable economics will only be achieved if Morocco 
and/or MENA succeed in establishing an export 
market with the E.U. However, this will require further 
investments in physical assets (for example, trans-
mission lines) and a strong commitment from E.U. 
Member States to go beyond their existing renewable 
targets. At the end of the day, this will be a question of 
political will, as likely as not subjected to the prevail-
ing winds of international progress toward a post-2020 
international outcome.
77 This point will be proved once the winning bid is selected and its content 
is made public. However, initial indications available at the time of writing 
support our assumption.
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Index of Acronyms
AFDB African Development Bank
AFD Agence Française de Développement
CAPEX Captial Expenditures
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
CPS Country Partnership Strategy (World Bank-Morocco)
CTF Clean Technology Fund
CSP Concentrated Solar Power
EIB European Investment Bank
EPC Engineering, Procurement, and Construction
ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
FDE Fond de Developpement de l’Energie
FESMP Framework Environmental and Social Management Plan
GOM Government of Morocco
HASSAN II Moroccan Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social Development
IFI International Financial Institution
IP Investment Plan
IPP Independent Power Producer
KFW Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau
LCOE Levelized Cost of Energy
MENA Middle East and North Africa
ONE Office National ede l’Electricité
ONEE Office National de l’Eau et de l’Electricité
ONEP Office National de l’ Eau Potable
OPEX Operating Expenditures
PAD Project appraisal document
PPA Power Purchase Agreement
PPP Public-Private Partnership
PSA Power Sale Agreement
SEEE Secrétariat d’Etat chargé de l’Eau et de l’Environnement
SICS Solar Incremental Cost Support
SIE Moroccan Energy Investment Company
SPC Solar Power Company
UGE Unité de Gestion de l‟Environnement
WB World Bank
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Annex B: Ouarzazate I sensitivity tests
Table 1: Production Variance
Source: CPI Elaborations
ProDuctIon varIance -10% BASE 10%
annual ProDuctIon (GWh) 333 370 407
Irr 6.2% 7.2% 8.3%
lcoe 302 276 254
DeGraDatIon factor 1.0% 0.5% 0.3%
Irr 6.8% 7.2% 7.5%
lcoe 287 276 271
i) Operating Performance
Table 1 depicts the sensitivity of the project IRR and 
of the Levelized Cost of Energy to deviations of annual 
production from forecasts due to uncertainty on the 
level of solar irradiance and/or to higher (or lower) than 
expected degradation factor.
ii) Cost Overruns
Table 2 illustrates the effect on the project economics 
of cost overruns due to higher (or lower) than expected 
capital investments or for higher requirements to 
operate and maintain the plant. Given the capital inten-
sity of the CSP plant, it’s not surprising that the invest-
ment metrics are more sensitive to deviations on capital 
costs than on operations and management charges.
Table 2: Construction and Operations Costs overruns
constructIon cost overruns ∆+20% ∆ +10% BASE
caPex ($ mIllIon) 1200 1100 1000
Irr after tax, levereD 10.1% 11.8% 13.8%
lcoe 282 260 240
oPex cost overruns ∆ +20% ∆ +10% BASE
oPex % of revenues 13% 12% 11%
Irr after tax, levereD 12.9% 13.1% 13.8%
lcoe 245 242 240
Source: CPI Elaborations
iii) Support Shortfall
The impact of Ouarzazate I on the government’s budget 
depends both on the solar subsidy and on the value of 
the fossil-fuel subsidies displaced by solar power that, in 
turn, depends on the fuel prices. Table 3 quantifies the 
effect on the budget of a hypothetical variation on the 
base prices used in the initial project planning (150$/
ton for coal, 450$/ton for fuel oil and 10$/mbtu for 
natural gas).
Table 3: Fuel Price Variance on 370 GWh of displaced FF electricity
Source: CPI Elaborations
fuel PrIce varIance ∆-30% ∆-20% BASE
Government ff subsIDIes 
savInGs (m$) 0 4 12
aDDItIonal solar subsIDy 
over counterfactual  (m$) 60 56 48
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Annex C: Lessons from GEF-
supported CSP projects 
Ouarzazate is the latest in a list of only moderately 
successful CSP projects in the MENA region. A study 
by the WB’s Independent Evaluation Group (IBRD, 
2010) explains why Global Environment Facility (GEF)-
supported CSP projects in Egypt, Mexico, and Morocco 
have been slow to come to fruition—after 13 years, 
two of the projects are still under construction, one is 
out to tender while another, to be located in India, was 
dropped due to technical difficulties. 
The GEF portfolio was intended to drive technology 
costs down but the planned capacity (120 MW) and the 
realized capacity (later downsized) plus its distribution 
over three countries made the realization of any econo-
mies of scale unfeasible. The spread across countries 
also undermined the creation of a local value chain.
A hybrid technology approach was chosen to alleviate 
concerns about power availability, combining conven-
tional gas plants with solar technology. However, the 
hybrid technology was novel and further complicated 
project design and procurement, as several providers 
had to be integrated to provide different components. 
In some cases the scarcity of bidders required adjust-
ments to procurement rules and caused subsequent 
delays.
Scarce information on technology costs, cumbersome 
procedures, and reduced numbers of bidders resulted 
in bids implying costs well above initial estimates. As 
the amount of the GEF grant was fixed in absolute value, 
the CSP plants had to be reduced in size, necessitating 
renegotiation and further delays, again reducing the 
expected effectiveness of public funds.
Finally, project sponsors required that plants would be 
operated under an IPP model, aiming to achieve a higher 
level of efficiency in the plant management compared 
to its operation by the state utility. Unfortunately, this 
management structure was not yet present in the host 
countries and was unappealing for state utilities, creat-
ing further institutional barriers in addition to the afore-
mentioned technological ones. ESMAP (2011) indicates 
that, ultimately, the IPP/PPA schemes did not work and 
had to be restructured into public projects, at the cost 
of contract renegotiation and significant construction 
delays.
This whole experience has most probably informed the 
decision by the CTF to concentrate investments in fewer 
projects of a significant scale such as Ouarzazate and to 
work closely with local institutions in the host country 
(i.e. MASEN for the case of Morocco) in order to choose 
a business model that aligns the objectives and expec-
tations of host governments (creating local opportuni-
ties), donors (building the experience of the public and 
private sectors which can be applied to future proj-
ects) and the private sector (investment security and 
opportunity).
